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ABSTRACT 
Plaintiffs have historically used defamation, privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress to vindicate their dignitary interests.  But fifty years ago in New York Times v. Sullivan, 
the Supreme Court reimagined these private law torts as public law causes of action that explicitly 
privileged speech over dignity.  This Article claims that Sullivan was a misguided attempt at 
alchemy, manipulating state action doctrine to create more of a precious commodity—speech—
while preserving a tort channel for the most deserving plaintiffs.  In Sullivan the Court departed 
from its usual practice of narrowly defining the relevant state action in constitutional challenges 
to private law matters.  Instead, it defined state action to include not just the isolated verdict being 
appealed but the entirety of the private law that produced the questionable verdict.  This approach 
aggrandized the Court’s authority to “fix” private law in the dignitary tort arena, where it seemed 
to fear that insular communities could chill important news coverage by imposing parochial norms 
onto the national community.  The Court used its enhanced remedial authority to design a 
national constitutional common law of dignitary tort.  In the quasi-statutory scheme that emerged, 
the Court attempted to strike an ex ante balance between valuable speech and wrongful behavior by 
conditioning liability on different scienter requirements for different categories of plaintiff.  But the 
Sullivan project is rapidly failing.  Operationally, insignificant but injurious speech such as 
revenge porn has flourished under the Court’s brittle categorization matrix.  Conceptually, the 
private law message that speakers owe some duty to those they discuss has been supplanted with a 
public law message that they have no duty of care.  And instrumentally, enhanced speech 
protections have resulted in more soft news about celebrities and less hard news about government.  
Nevertheless, the Court’s original goal—barring the imposition of insular community norms onto 
the nation as a whole while preserving a legally protected interest in individual dignity—is 
important and achievable.  The rulemaking of the Sullivan cases should be retired in favor of a 
general constitutional principle barring judicial enforcement of verdicts that impose local 
community norms onto the national community.  This is precisely the kind of strong but flexible 
constitutional guidance the Court would have rendered in Sullivan if it had followed its usual 
state action approach.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Fifty years ago, in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court 
began to redistrict defamation, privacy, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress from the realm of private law constructed by local 
juries and courts to the realm of public law promulgated by the Court 
itself.  The Court essentially rewrote these torts to nullify their impact 
on democratically significant speech. 
Sullivan was a remarkable act of alchemy, transforming what for 
centuries had been dignity-protective torts that signaled a duty of 
care towards plaintiffs into speech-protective torts that signaled the 
opposite.  The Court managed this feat by taking an unprecedented 
approach to finding the state action necessary to justify constitutional 
scrutiny of these torts.  The Court defined the relevant state action in 
Sullivan at a level of generality never before found in a case challeng-
ing the constitutionality of a state private law verdict.  This generous 
definition of the relevant state action meant that the Court had more 
authority to remedy the eventual deficiencies it found in the state law 
with a tort scheme of its own making.  Crucially, the Court’s remak-
ing of the common law turned on whether the plaintiff was catego-
rized as “public” or “private.”  In the pre-Internet age, these catego-
ries were rough proxies for the civic importance of the speech 
involved.  But in an age of social media speech designed to encour-
age the performance of private life on a public platform, the great 
majority of individuals have become “public” to some extent, putting 
tort remedies for speech injuries out of reach for many. 
Popular sentiment in favor of the Sullivan outcome has obscured 
serious attention to the state action analysis in the case.  But that 
analysis explains both the promise and the problems associated with 
the constitutionalization of dignitary tort law.  By deploying a radical-
ly general definition of the state action under review in the case, the 
Court was able to block local communities from externalizing their 
values onto the national community, a dynamic that had the potential 
to silence important speech.  However, the Court’s quasi-statutory 
“correction” of this area of the law has disabled dignitary tort as a re-
sponse to online injuries such as cyberbullying, revenge porn, and 
mugshot extortion.  Legislators are now struggling to criminalize the-
se behaviors ex ante via statute, despite First Amendment objections.1  
 
 1 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV.  345, 372–74 & nn.175–76 (2014) (discussing different states’ attempts 
pass bills criminalizing the publishing of revenge porn and outlining parameters of the 
crime). 
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Freed from the Court’s categorical scheme, tort has the potential to 
send ex post deterrent signals against injurious behavior.  Such a pri-
vate law approach would be less speech-inhibiting than criminalizing 
entire categories of communication and invoking the state’s prosecu-
torial apparatus against those who violate these statutory prior re-
straints.2 
Part I of this Article examines the Court’s typical treatment of 
constitutional challenges to judicial actions involving private law 
rules.  It demonstrates that in cases involving contract law, property 
law, trust law, and economic torts, the Court has consistently identi-
fied the relevant state action as the discrete enforcement action un-
der review—that is, the specific verdict or injunction being chal-
lenged.3  Because it labors to narrow the state action under 
consideration to the exercise of power that has infringed a specific 
litigant’s constitutional right, it typically restricts itself to reversing 
just the state court injunction or verdict against that litigant.4  In this 
respect, the Court’s practice is akin to a prudential jurisdictional rule, 
and it provides similar separation-of-powers and federalism benefits.  
First, it prevents the Court from overreaching horizontally into the 
lawmaking function.  When state action is defined narrowly, the most 
the Court can do is invalidate the discrete verdict or injunction at is-
sue, rather than jettison a fully developed body of private law in favor 
of its own scheme.  Second, it prevents the Court from overreaching 
vertically into the structural prerogative of the states and their subsid-
iary communities.  When state action is defined narrowly, the Court’s 
role is to approve or disprove the rules that states have developed in 
accord with their local preferences, rather than to infuse state rules 
with preferences that reflect the national ethos. 
Part II of this Article contrasts the Court’s prudential state action 
approach with its analysis in Sullivan, where a Montgomery, Alabama, 
official sued over his depiction in the pages of the New York Times.  
There, the Court identified as state action not just the specific verdict 
against the Times but the entirety of Alabama libel law as it was ap-
plied to litigants generally.5  This Part demonstrates that if the Court 
had followed its usual approach and defined the relevant state action 
to include just the verdict against the Times, it could have protected 
the newspaper from liability by simply reversing the verdict as an un-
 
 2 See generally Anne Bloom, The Radiating Effects of Torts, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 229 (2013) 
(identifying how tort suits can influence public behavior). 
 3 See infra Part I.B. 
 4 See infra Part I.B. 
 5 See infra Part II. 
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constitutional application of existing state tort rules.6  Instead, the 
Court defined the relevant state action to include all of Alabama libel 
law, found that body of law constitutionally deficient, and supplied a 
replacement set of federal tort rules.7  This radical approach did not 
just correct the verdict in this case but redistricted the tort of libel 
from a purely private law matter under sole control of the states to a 
hybrid public-private law matter shared by the state and federal gov-
ernment.  Further, in broadly defining and then drastically reimagin-
ing Alabama libel law, the Court essentially took for itself a power 
that the Constitution specifically denied to Congress and the states:  
generating centralized government norms for speech.8 
Part III considers why the Court was so enthusiastic about broad-
ening the scope of state action in Sullivan and reengineering digni-
tary torts in the cases that followed.  It rejects the possibility that the 
Court is motivated by a special solicitude for speech, since it defines 
state action modestly in contract, property, and financial tort cases 
where private law is alleged to abridge speech.9  It ultimately con-
cludes that the Court’s manipulation of the state action definition in 
these cases is an attempt to grapple with the multiplicity of communi-
ties within the United States in the context of torts that explicitly in-
voke “community” norms to determine wrongfulness.10  At the found-
ing, the United States was a collection of local communities, each of 
which was fairly homogenous, stable, and culturally compact.  Digni-
tary torts inflicted via communication were generally restricted to the 
confines of these communities, meaning that the community norms 
governing the finding of a legal wrong were easily ascertained and 
shared.  By the mid-twentieth century, the United States had added to 
these subsidiary communities a national tier of community, which was 
transient and heterogeneous.  Further, faster communications and 
printing technologies had transformed the news business from an ex-
clusively local concern to a national endeavor.  Consequently, defa-
mation cases were no longer exclusively local disputes, but had the 
potential to pit the values of local communities against each other, or 
against the values of a national community.11  The Court’s desire to 
 
 6 See infra Part II.B. 
 7 See infra Part II.B. 
 8 See infra Part II.B. 
 9 See infra Part III.A. 
 10 See infra Part III.B. 
 11 See infra Part III.B.1. 
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mediate this contest is the most persuasive explanation for its activist 
state action approach in Sullivan.12 
Part IV analyzes the Court’s use of Sullivan as a springboard for 
horizontal overreaching into the lawmaking function.  The decision 
began the process of transforming defamation, privacy, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) from private law stress-
ing compensation for injury to public law stressing speakers’ rights.  
This Part begins by describing the constitutional common law rules 
promulgated by the Court.  These rules attempt to balance dignity 
and speech by creating a matrix of plaintiff categories and culpability 
categories and assigning different constitutional protections to each 
category.13  The goal of the scheme was to protect democratically rel-
evant speech while preserving a right to dignitary compensation for 
insignificant or exceptionally injurious speech.14  But the inconsisten-
cy and imprecision of these categories has sent confusing signals 
about the Court’s commitment to retaining a viable tort device for 
dignitary interests.  Part IV concludes by suggesting that these defects 
in the Court’s scheme are a direct result of the non-prudential state 
action analysis in Sullivan, which allowed the Court to step outside its 
institutional competence—deciding cases—and instead attempt to 
legislate, an endeavor for which it was ill-suited. 
Part V examines how the Court’s lawmaking scheme effectively 
accomplished a vertical overreach into the state prerogative to make 
private law that reflects its political sovereignty and respects the val-
ues of its subsidiary communities.  This Part shows how the Court 
suppressed the values of state and subsidiary communities as it re-
made dignitary tort law.  First, the Court wiped out individual state 
rules designed to distinguish message-oriented speech from injury-
oriented speech, imposing instead a uniform federal scheme for do-
ing so.15  Second, the Court declined to defer to state rules that could 
have informed the content of its categorical scheme.  Finally, the 
Court repeatedly overturned jury instructions and jury verdicts that 
delegated to members of local communities the responsibility to de-
cide when speech was sufficiently injurious to warrant a tort verdict.16  
Throughout its dignitary tort cases, the Court consistently denigrated 
both states as a unit of civic organization and local communities as a 
 
 12 See infra Part III.B.1. 
 13 See infra Part IV.A. 
 14 See infra Part IV.A. 
 15 See infra Part V. 
 16 See infra Part V. 
Apr. 2015] ALCHEMY OF STATE ACTION 1123 
 
unit of social organization, designing rules that disempowered those 
entities by imposing central government speech rules. 
Part VI documents how Sullivan has failed to deliver on its early 
promise to protect nationally significant speech while preserving a 
tort channel to vindicate insignificant or exceptionally injurious 
speech. While the Court’s public-private categories have shielded un-
popular national speech from expensive jury verdicts, they are grow-
ing irrelevant in the age of electronic speech and social media.17  
Speech conducted over Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram is not easily 
described as either public or private.  In these exchanges, uncele-
brated individuals may be communicating with each other while 
hundreds or thousands “follow,” “like,” or “retweet” their speech.  
This dynamic turns on their heads concepts such as “public figure,” 
“private figure,” and “issues of public concern.”  As more online 
speech seems to drift definitionally into these constitutionally pro-
tected “public” categories, tort causes of action have grown function-
ally unavailable to plaintiffs.  This state of affairs means that tort’s 
signaling power is sending the message that individuals do not have a 
legally protected interest in their dignity and that speakers do not 
have a duty of care to avoid doing dignitary harm.18  This message 
appears inconsistent with the Court’s design in Sullivan, which explic-
itly recognized the continuing relevance of the defamation tort de-
spite carving out a protection for publicly relevant speech.  Finally, 
these costs to individual dignity have not been offset by the benefit of 
more democratically relevant speech, at least in the context of news 
coverage.19 
Part VII suggests that the dignitary tort law that would have fol-
lowed from a prudential state action analysis would better achieve the 
central goal of Sullivan for today’s era.  When the Court has followed 
prudential state action analysis, it has restricted itself to announcing 
constitutional principles and invalidating or remanding verdicts that 
disobey those principles.  This approach to dignitary tort is better 
suited for the modern age.  The constitutional principle of Sullivan is 
that subsidiary communities may not externalize their behavioral 
norms onto other subsidiary communities or the national communi-
ty.20  The Court’s obsolete categorical scheme should be retired in fa-
vor of a rule prohibiting court enforcement of verdicts that external-
ize subsidiary community norms.  Thus, where both speech and 
 
 17 See infra Part VI.A. 
 18 See infra Part VI.B. 
 19 See infra Part VI.C. 
 20 See infra Part VII.A. 
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injury take place within a relatively homogenous subcommunity, pri-
vate law treatment is warranted and constitutional rejection of result-
ing verdicts will be unnecessary.21  In contrast, when speech is nation-
al in nature and injury is the product of a subcommunity’s values (or 
when speech resides within an insular subcommunity but the national 
community agrees that the speech is harmful), public law oversight of 
the tort remedy is warranted.22  This approach would retain both the 
private law and public law versions of dignitary tort but allow particu-
lar cases to be sifted into the different tiers of law more flexibly to 
permit nimble ex post responses to emerging technologies. Reani-
mating the private law of tort as an inexpensive signaling device may 
ultimately be more speech-protective than current efforts to criminal-
ize revenge porn, mugshot extortion, and cyberbullying behavior. 
I.  STATE ACTION:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL LINK BETWEEN PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE 
The Court cannot review the constitutionality of purely private ac-
tion; its authority to review cases “arising under” the Constitution23 
depends on a finding that the behavior at issue in the case can be at-
tributed to the state.24  This state action requirement is crucial to the 
Court’s power, and yet it has remained a highly indeterminate con-
cept for more than a century.  The Court has failed to develop a doc-
trinally coherent principle for distinguishing between state behavior 
and private behavior when the state and private individuals have 
jointly deprived an opponent of constitutional rights.  More specifi-
cally, when the lower court action under review is the adjudication of 
a dispute between private parties based on private law principles, the 
Court has never explicitly stated how much of state private law should 
be swept within the “state action” definition.  In practice, however, 
the Court has followed what appears to be a prudential rule that the 
relevant state action should be defined at the most granular level pos-
sible.  As a result, the Court generally considers the actual verdict in 
the case as the state action, and does not examine the abstract private 
law rules that produced the verdict.  This practice has been followed 
in contract, property, trust and estate, and economic tort cases over 
the years. 
 
 21 See infra Part VII.B.1. 
 22 See infra Part VII.B.2. 
 23 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 24 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also The Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). 
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This approach appears to share constitutional DNA with other 
prudential requirements applied in the “case or controversy” context, 
wherein the Court employs rules that prevent it from encroaching on 
coordinate branches of government or on the state prerogative to de-
velop local law.25  Like those prudential rules, the prudential practice 
of narrowly defining state action has generally prevented the Court 
from formulating rules of law broader than those necessary to resolve 
the case at hand. 
A. The High Stakes of the State Action Requirement 
The Fourteenth Amendment provided in 1868 that no “State 
[shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”26  The command means that action by govern-
ment at any level—federal, state, or local—is now subject to the in-
corporated provisions of the Constitution.27  Thus, determining 
whether the Constitution applies to behavior alleged to deprive an 
individual of a guaranteed right must begin with determining wheth-
er the complained-of behavior is state action.  State action theory has 
been notoriously called a “conceptual disaster area.”28  Several distinct 
phenomena have contributed to this so-called disaster.  Many disa-
gree about the purpose of the state action requirement.29  Further, 
 
 25 See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law:  A Critique 
of the Supreme Court’s Theory that Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1289, 1294–95 (2005) (explaining that the Court’s self-imposed limits on its federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, including justiciability doctrines and abstention, were designed to pre-
vent the Court from violating separation of powers principles and from encroaching up-
on state authority). 
 26 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 27 Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 507 n.15 (1985) (cita-
tion omitted). 
 28 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term—Foreword:  “State Action,” Equal Protec-
tion, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967). 
 29 The purpose of the requirement is not altogether clear.  Some opine that immunizing 
non-state action from constitutional scrutiny maximizes individual autonomy; the typical 
examples of behavior that falls outside the realm of state action include selecting a spouse 
or hosting a dinner party.  See, e.g., Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, The State Action Princi-
ple and Its Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1769 (2010) (noting that individuals’ decisions 
about whom to marry are not state action); see also Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, Developments in the 
Law—State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1257 (2010) 
(noting that Justice Joseph P. Bradley, introducing the state action doctrine in the Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883), suggested that treating relations between private indi-
viduals as immune from constitutional scrutiny “promote[d] the individualist goal of self-
realization”).  In contrast, others say that limiting federal constitutional review to state ac-
tion rather than individual action is a way of allocating power between the state and fed-
eral governments.  Jesse H. Choper, Thoughts on State Action:  The “Government Function” 
and “Power Theory” Approaches, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 757, 757–58 (1979).  That is, a chal-
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evolving theories about state action reflect the movement in Ameri-
can legal thought from a formal to an instrumental view of the law’s 
purpose and the judge’s power.30 
Attempts to theorize the appropriate line between state action and 
private action abound,31 but the Court has not settled on a single co-
 
lenge to the constitutionality of an individual act is really a challenge to how the state has 
played its role as an intermediary between individual desires and federal constitutional 
commands.  If the state encouraged the act or failed to exercise its intermediary preven-
tative power when it should have, state action exists and the federal government can in-
tervene—either via judicial review or congressional legislation—to offset the state in-
fringement of constitutional rights.  Id. at 757–58.  Identifying the existence of state 
action is complicated by the duality of purpose behind the requirement.  If the require-
ment is designed to maximize individual autonomy, the benign neglect of a state may fur-
ther that autonomy and the state action classification may be counterproductive. Con-
versely, if the requirement is designed to deputize the individual states as enforcers of 
constitutional values, state passivity that permits private unconstitutional behavior to 
flourish is problematic and warrants a state action classification. 
 30 State action theory has been said to have proceeded in three phases roughly concurrent 
with trends in American legal thought.  The bedrock “state action” opinion in the Civil 
Rights Cases of 1883 is typical of classical legal thought with its “way of thinking about law 
as a system of spheres of autonomy for private and public actors . . . .”  Developments in the 
Law, supra note 29, at 1256 (quoting Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Le-
gal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:  A CRITICAL 
APPRAISAL 19, 20 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006)).  Justice Bradley con-
cluded that the guarantee to individuals of due process was not violated by private acts 
that lacked the imprimatur of the state.  Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 29, at 1256–58.  
Thus, although the Fourteenth Amendment authorized Congress to pass laws enforcing 
the due process guarantee, Congress did not have authority under the amendment to 
pass federal laws that aimed to regulate private acts.  The second phase of state action 
thinking, taking place in the mid-twentieth century, was consistent with social instrumen-
talist thinking.  State action analysis during that period tended to accept the need for a 
division between the public and private but moved away from formalism to allow applica-
tion of the Constitution to address the social problem of racial discrimination, which 
seemed intractable to all but a federal public law response.  Id. at 1258.  It was during the 
heyday of these cases that Justice Jackson remarked in Brown v. Allen:  “this Court has 
found [state action] a ready instrument, in one field or another, to magnify federal, and 
incidentally its own, authority over the states.”  344 U.S. 443, 534 (1953) (Jackson, J., con-
curring).  Contemporary state action theory is split to reflect what Kennedy calls “‘the 
unsynthesized coexistence of transformed elements of [classical legal thought] with trans-
formed elements of the social.’”  Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 29, at 1261 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Kennedy, supra note 30, at 63).  Today, some advocate the elimination 
of the doctrine altogether to allow a full account of rights and interests, while others want 
to retain it in the name of protecting individual autonomy.  Developments in the Law, supra 
note 29, at 1261. 
 31 See BeVier & Harrison, supra note 29, at 1773 (theorizing that state action exists when a 
public rather than private choice invokes the application of government power); Robert 
J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment “State Ac-
tion” Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221, 226–27 (1976) (observing that the “unitary” 
conceptualization of state action has given way to a functional view, under which “the 
Court decides state action cases by balancing the values which are advanced or limited by 
each of the conflicting private rights”); Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 29, at 1261 n.45 
(citing cases defending the state action doctrine). 
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herent principle to guide its analysis.  The ad hoc approach to state 
action may be less significant in cases where the conduct under re-
view is concrete and finite—if a privately run primary election is state 
action,32 the election mechanism is subject to the Constitution, and 
private actors running the election can either run the election ac-
cordingly or stop running elections altogether.  The Court’s applica-
tion of the Constitution to the action simply compels constitutional 
adherence or abstention, but neither response creates a legal vacuum 
for the Court to fill. 
The ambiguity in state action theory has potentially greater con-
sequences in fact patterns where state authority fortifies allegedly un-
constitutional private action, for instance where a court adjudicates a 
contract, property, or tort dispute.  Scholars such as Erwin 
Chemerinsky and Cass Sunstein contend that “state action is always 
present”33 because all private relations are negotiated based on alloca-
tions of rights, powers, and interests conferred by law.  That is, all pri-
vate exercises of power are premised on the state’s allocation of 
background rights and duties and are effective only because of the 
possibility of enforcement via a private law suit adjudicated in the 
public courts.34  If all private behavior subject to challenge in court 
under private law rules is considered state action, dramatic conse-
quences follow.  Either the courts have unconstrained power to ex-
tend constitutional norms to private behavior, or Congress has the 
power under the Fourteenth Amendment itself to pass legislation re-
placing state action (or inaction) that has created an unconstitutional 
background private law rule with a federally preferred rule. 
B. State Action in Private Law Cases 
Because of the dramatic consequences of the state action deter-
mination in private law cases, the Supreme Court’s first move—
defining the relevant state action—may be its most significant one. If 
the Court defines the relevant state action as the specific verdict or 
injunction rendered in the case under review, a finding of unconsti-
tutionality leaves nothing to do but reverse or remand the particular 
case before it.  But if the Court defines the relevant state action to in-
 
 32 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663–64 (1944). 
 33 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 27, at 506 (suggesting the elimination of the state action 
requirement as a precursor to constitutional scrutiny); Cass R. Sunstein, State Action is Al-
ways Present, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 465, 467 (2002) [hereinafter Sunstein, State Action] (noting 
that much discussion ignores the extent of state presence). 
 34 See, e.g., Sunstein, State Action, supra note 33, at 466. 
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clude the underlying principles of private law that produced the ver-
dict, a finding of unconstitutionality is far more significant.  Delegit-
imizing foundational rules of contract, property, estates, or tort that 
common law courts have developed over decades leaves a vacuum 
and throws the ordering of private relations into disarray.35  The 
Court has never articulated a prudential rule to govern this defini-
tional exercise in private law cases, but its opinions reveal a consistent 
and modest practice:  the Court generally defines the relevant state 
action at a very granular level, so that even if it finds the action un-
constitutional, it has no more to do than affirm or reverse the specific 
verdict or injunction below. 
1. Contract 
The Court first considered whether litigation governed by private 
law principles was state action in Shelley v. Kraemer.36  Shelley involved 
the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants pursuant to state 
contract law, one in Missouri and one in Michigan, among large 
groups of homeowners providing that no parcels were to be owned by 
non-Caucasians.37  In the Missouri case, upon the sale of one parcel to 
an African-American family, the owners of neighboring properties 
sued for an injunction restraining the family from taking possession 
and revesting the title in the seller or some other person identified by 
the court.38  The Missouri trial court denied the requested relief be-
cause the agreement did not comply with the requirements for mak-
ing a contract under state law, but the Missouri Supreme Court re-
versed and ordered the trial court to grant the injunctive relief 
 
 35 Not all background rules of private law are the product of common-law lawmaking, and 
not all common-law lawmaking produces private law.  For instance, some private law 
principles in the cases discussed below were provided for via statute.  See, e.g., Evans v. 
Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 439–40 (1970) (noting that Georgia law provided that Georgia cities 
and towns could accept property for the establishment of parks and hold the property in 
trust for the benefit of persons named by the testator); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 261 (1964) (noting that Alabama law denied a public officer recovery in a 
libel action).  Further, some rules derived from state judge common law adjudication are 
decidedly public in nature, such as rules empowering the state to oversee picketing and 
to issue judicial contempt citations.  See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1948) 
(citing as examples of judicial state action enforcement of state policies developed by 
common-law adjudication against peaceful picketing, the common law crime of breach of 
the peace, and the common law rule allowing contempt citations for disrespect of judicial 
authority by publication). 
 36 334 U.S. at 4. 
 37 Id. at 6. 
 38 Id. 
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requested.39  In the Michigan case, the African-American purchasers 
moved into the home and other owners brought suit.40  The judge en-
tered a decree directing the purchasers to vacate the house within 
ninety days; the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed.41 
The Supreme Court emphasized that it was not reviewing the un-
derlying abstract rules of contract that permitted the restrictive cove-
nants:   
[R]estrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as a viola-
tion of any rights guaranteed to [the] petitioners by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  So long as the purposes of those agreements are effectuat-
ed by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear clear that there 
has been no action by the State and the provisions of the Amendment 
have not been violated.42   
Instead, it described the relevant state action question in the cases:  
“whether enforcement by state courts of the restrictive agreements in 
these cases may be deemed to be the acts of those States . . . .”43 When 
the state “made available to [the covenantors] the full coercive power 
of government to deny to [the buyers] . . . the enjoyment of property 
rights in [the] premises[,]” it engaged in state action.44  Even though 
the enforcement actions were “directed pursuant to the common-law 
policy of the States as formulated by those courts in earlier deci-
sions[,]”45 the state action requiring constitutional review and reversal 
was the enforcement alone, not the common-law policy of the states.46  
The underlying contract principles of the states were neither re-
viewed nor revised.  For instance, had the Court defined the state ac-
tion more broadly to include the underlying rules of contract, it 
could have announced a constitutional rule that racially restrictive 
covenants were per se unconscionable. 
Five years later, in Barrows v. Jackson, the Court found that a state 
court award of damages for breaching a restrictive covenant agree-
ment would also have been state action (although every court to con-
sider the plaintiff’s request for contract damages had declined to 
award them): 
To compel respondent to respond in damages would be for the State to 
punish her for her failure to perform her covenant to continue to dis-
 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 7. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 13. 
 43 Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 
 44 Id. at 19. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 13. 
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criminate against non-Caucasians in the use of her property.  The result 
of that sanction by the State would be to encourage the use of restrictive 
covenants.  To that extent, the State would act to put its sanction behind 
the covenants.  If the State may thus punish respondent for her failure to 
carry out her covenant, she is coerced to continue to use her property in 
a discriminatory manner, which in essence is the purpose of the cove-
nant.  Thus, it becomes not respondent’s voluntary choice but the State’s 
choice that she observe her covenant or suffer damages.  The action of a 
state court at law to sanction the validity of the restrictive covenant here 
involved would constitute state action as surely as it was state action to en-
force such covenants in equity, as in Shelley . . . .47 
The Court therefore affirmed the California lower court decision 
granting the demurrer to the complaint seeking damages and the 
state reviewing court’s affirmance of that decision.48  As in Shelley, alt-
hough the Court was willing to apply public law principles to a private 
law matter, it restricted the scope of review to the specific enforce-
ment action without examining the particulars of California’s con-
tract law for constitutional defects.49 
In a more recent case analyzing the state action status of a state 
private law of promissory estoppel, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the 
Court defined the state action more broadly but again deferred to the 
state’s authority to develop private law.50  In Cohen, the Court re-
viewed the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court that where a 
newspaper that had promised anonymity to a source and later identi-
fied him in its pages, the source could not succeed in an action for 
damages relying on the principle of promissory estoppel.51  The state 
court reasoned that applying its law of promissory estoppel, which 
was designed to prevent “injustice,” necessarily required weight to be 
given to the media’s First Amendment rights to determine the “jus-
tice” served by a damage award.52  The Court stated that the first issue 
in the case was whether a private cause of action for promissory es-
toppel was state action that triggered the First Amendment.53  The 
Court defined the relevant state action more broadly here, to include 
the background rules that gave rise to the obligation between the 
parties.  But it coupled this more expansive state action definition 
 
 47 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953). 
 48 Id. at 249, 260. 
 49 Chief Justice Frederick M. Vinson, in dissent, suggested that even categorizing the en-
forcement of a damages award as state action was pressing the Constitution too far, bar-
ring California from developing and applying its own private law of contract.  Id. at 263–
64 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
 50 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991). 
 51 Id. at 665–67. 
 52 Id. at 667. 
 53 Id. at 668. 
Apr. 2015] ALCHEMY OF STATE ACTION 1131 
 
with a highly deferential review of the abstract promissory estoppel 
rules.  The Court reasoned that because the Minnesota private law 
rules of promissory estoppel were neutral rules “applicable to the dai-
ly transactions of all the citizens of Minnesota,” and did not “single 
out” the press, they were not an infringement on the newspaper’s 
First Amendment rights.54 
2. Property 
The Court has demonstrated the same pattern of defining state 
action at a granular level in property cases.  Peterson v. City of Green-
ville55 involved a set of consolidated cases where participants in civil 
rights sit-ins were convicted of trespass in South Carolina, Louisiana, 
Alabama, and North Carolina.  The Court found state action underly-
ing the trespass convictions because the private store and restaurant 
owners who had asked the patrons to leave and eventually sought po-
lice enforcement of those requests were motivated by local laws, or-
dinances, and official statements either requiring or endorsing segre-
gated facilities.  Thus, in these cases, judicial enforcement of a state 
private law property right to exclude visitors from the establishment 
was more than a neutral application of property law principles, but 
was imbued with a state preference for segregation.  The convictions, 
therefore, were reversed.56  The Court did not examine the underly-
ing principles of state trespass law in any of the cases, instead restrict-
ing itself to reversing the specific enforcement actions. 
In Bell v. Maryland,57 the Court addressed the convictions of stu-
dent sit-in participants for criminal trespass charges brought by a lo-
cal restaurateur who called the police after the students refused to 
leave his establishment.  In a 3-3-3 split opinion, the Court remanded 
the case for reconsideration in light of changes in both Baltimore 
and Maryland segregation law.58  However, one-third of the Court 
 
 54 Id. at 670. 
 55 373 U.S. 244 (1963); see generally Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 
(1963) (Alabama criminal trespass case); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) 
(Louisiana demonstration case); Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963) (per 
curiam) (Alabama demonstration case); Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963) 
(per curiam) (North Carolina demonstration case). 
 56 Notably, Justice John Marshall Harlan II examined the circumstances behind each indi-
vidual protest and suggested that unless the protesters could prove that the private land-
owners brought the trespass actions solely because they felt compelled by state segrega-
tion law to do so, the trespass actions were private—not state—action.  Peterson v. City of 
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248–61 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 57 378 U.S. 226, 227–28 (1964). 
 58 Id. at 241–42. 
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concurred only because it would have reversed the convictions after 
concluding that the criminal enforcement of the trespass law against 
the protesters was unconstitutional state action.  That wing of the 
Court reasoned that the relevant question was “the degree to which a 
State has participated in depriving a person of a right.”59  Here, the 
criminal trespass statute was used by a private person to deny another 
private person access to property solely on the basis of race.  But be-
cause “Maryland enforced that [race-based private] policy with her 
police, her prosecutors, and her courts[,]” it had deployed state ac-
tion that triggered constitutional review.60 In contrast, a dissenting 
wing of the Court concluded that Maryland’s application of its tres-
pass laws to the protesters was not state action.  The dissenting Justic-
es reasoned that the state trespass law was not promulgated to achieve 
a racially restrictive end, but merely established “every property-
owner’s . . . normal right to choose his business visitors or social 
guests . . . .”61  That the property owner’s choices were animated by 
segregationist goals did not mean that judicial enforcement of the 
longstanding Maryland property principles were an instance of state 
segregationist action.62  Notably, no member of the Court suggested 
that Maryland’s underlying private law allocating to property owners 
the right to decide who could enter their land was state action under 
constitutional review, or suggested any doctrinal changes to that un-
derlying law.  Even those who wished to define the convictions under 
the law as state action restricted the relevant judicial state action to 
the adjudication of the specific cases before the court and entry of 
the convictions—in short, to “enforcement” of the private law of tres-
pass, not to the underlying development of those trespass principles.63 
3. Trusts and Estates 
The Court has followed the same approach in the context of state 
trust law.  Evans v. Abney involved the construction by a Georgia trial 
court of a trust that conveyed property to the city of Macon for use as 
 
 59 Id. at 257. 
 60 Id. (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 61 Id. at 332 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 228 (1964) (referring to “convictions” as the action); id. at 
245 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing the action under consideration as the commer-
cial consequence of the state’s discrimination); id. at 318 (Black, J., dissenting) (describ-
ing the question as whether Maryland could “enforce its trespass laws to convict” the pro-
testers). 
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a whites-only park.64  In an earlier case, Evans v. Newton, the Court 
had held that city administration of a segregated park was unconstitu-
tional state action.65  In response, the trustees of the grantor’s estate 
moved for a ruling that the specific intent of the grantor to create a 
park for the “sole, perpetual and unending, use, benefit and enjoy-
ment of the white women, white girls, white boys and white children 
of the City of Macon,” and “under no circumstances . . . to be . . . at 
any time for any reason devoted to any other purpose[,]” meant that 
requiring the city to integrate the park would defeat the purpose of 
the trust.66  The Georgia court was urged to apply the state’s statutory 
cy pres doctrine to read the racially restrictive terms out of the gran-
tor’s will so that the general purpose of creating a park could be real-
ized.67  The state court refused to apply cy pres, explaining that if a 
grantor’s primary intent was not general charity, but a specific and 
impossible scheme, cy pres was not justified and the grantor is pre-
sumed to have preferred that the trust fail.68  In this case, the state 
court concluded, that meant that the parkland should revert to the 
grantor’s heirs.69  On review, the Supreme Court found that the 
court’s application of Georgia trust principles in the construction of 
the will was state action but was constitutionally permissible.  It rea-
soned that “[t]he construction of wills is essentially a state law ques-
tion,” and this will was construed to prioritize the segregation of the 
parkland over the public donation of the parkland.70  The Court was 
persuaded that the state action was constitutional in large part be-
cause both the underlying trust rules and the state courts’ application 
of them appeared to be neutral and unmotivated by unconstitutional, 
race-conscious intent. 
4. Torts 
Finally, the Court has defined state action at a granular level in 
the private law of torts where the cause of action reflected a plaintiff’s 
interest in business relations.  In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., the 
 
 64 396 U.S. 435, 436 (1970). 
 65 382 U.S. 296, 311–12 (1966) (White, J., concurring) (finding that the tract of land willed 
in trust by Senator Augustus O. Bacon to the city exclusively for use by white people could 
not continue to be operated on a discriminatory basis). 
 66 Abney, 396 U.S. at 439, 441–42 (first and second omission in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 67 Id. at 439–40. 
 68 Id. at 441–42. 
 69 Id. at 436. 
 70 Id. at 444. 
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Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed a malicious interference with 
business relations verdict entered by an equity court imposing dam-
ages on civil rights protesters who organized a boycott against local 
businesses.71  The Court noted that the state action under review in 
the case was the “application” of Mississippi tort law to adjudicate the 
private law dispute between the parties.72  It then conducted an as-
applied review of the analysis in the case, determining that the lower 
court had distorted the facts presented at trial to characterize the en-
tirety of the months-long boycott as violent and therefore tortious.73  
Instead, performing its own review of the record, the Court conclud-
ed that the boycott featured some violent activity interspersed with a 
great deal of peaceful expressive activity.74  The Court then reversed 
the tort judgment and damages verdict against all of the protesters 
and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Court’s explanation 
that the weighty constitutional interest in speech required the court 
below to identify specific acts of concrete violence before imposing 
tort liability on any of the protesters.75  The Court did not review, let 
alone replace, the abstract principles of Mississippi tortious interfer-
ence law. 76 
C. The Prudential Benefits of the Court’s Definitional Pattern 
The state action doctrine is usually conceptualized as a matter of 
constitutional, and ultimately, political, theory.  When the Court’s job 
is to determine whether private behavior should be imputed to the 
government, that conceptualization is sound.  But in the narrow cat-
egory of cases involving the adjudication of private law claims, the 
weight of the question shifts from one grounded in political theory 
about the relationship between individual and state to one grounded 
in jurisdictional theory about the relationship of the Court to other 
institutional actors.  After all, there is little doubt in these cases that 
state action exists—the state court has rendered a verdict or injunc-
tion, which in turn dictates how far the Court’s remedial power will 
extend.  Without explicitly describing the question as such, the Court 
seems to have deployed prudential considerations to answer it.  This 
approach is, perhaps, unsurprising.  The Court has historically em-
 
 71 458 U.S. 886, 891, 894 (1982). 
 72 Id. at 916 n.51 (emphasis added). 
 73 Id. at 922–23. 
 74 Id. at 928. 
 75 Id.  
 76 Id.  
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ployed prudential doctrines to voluntarily limit the reach of its own 
power when it appears that the exercise of that power may impose on 
a competing institutional actor.77  The Court is generally thought to 
have adopted existing prudential rules policing its own jurisdiction, 
such as justiciability doctrines, abstention doctrines, sovereign im-
munity, and the like, to prevent both horizontal overreaching into 
the lawmaking function and vertical overreaching into the preroga-
tive of state governments to develop and apply their own law.  For in-
stance, prudential standing rules reinforce the separation of powers 
principle by limiting the Court to resolution of specific disputes ra-
ther than far-reaching abstract policy questions that have been allo-
cated to the political branches.78  These rules prevent horizontal en-
croachment upon the other branches of the federal government.  
Similarly, prudential rules have been said to “have a strong federalism 
component,” preventing the Court from vertically invading the prov-
ince of the states.79 
Prudential concerns make sense of the Court’s usual approach to 
defining state action when reviewing state court adjudication of a pri-
vate law claim:  although the Court almost certainly can define state 
action as broadly as it wishes, it generally has defined state action very 
narrowly.  Throughout contract, property, trusts and estates, and tort, 
the Court has demonstrated a consistent approach to defining the 
“state action” involved in alleged constitutional harms arising from 
enforcement of private law principles.  It defines the relevant state ac-
tion at a granular level, to include just the rendering of a verdict or 
injunction in a specific case.  If it finds the action unconstitutional, it 
 
 77 While many theorists praise the Court’s self-restraint via prudential doctrines, see, e.g., 
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword:  The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. 
L. REV. 40, 79 (1961), some feel the Court is constitutionally obliged to exercise its Article 
III jurisdiction, see, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Passive Virtues, the Counter-Majoritarian Prin-
ciple, and the “Judicial-Political” Model of Constitutional Adjudication, 22 CONN. L. REV. 647, 
647–48 (1990) (arguing that “the passive virtues are, to varying degrees, premised on a 
misconception of the judiciary’s vital political role within our constitutional system”).  
This article does not take a position on whether the Court’s voluntary passivity is good or 
bad as a matter of political theory.  Instead, it observes that in the state action context (as 
in other contexts), the Court appears to have manipulated its prudential approach to 
achieve a policy goal and appears to attempt to demonstrate that it might have better 
achieved that goal by hewing to the same prudential approach it has followed throughout 
the rest of its cases defining the state action represented by private law adjudication. 
 78 See, e.g., William Marks, Note, Bond, Buckley, and the Boundaries of Separation of Powers 
Standing, 67 VAND. L. REV. 505, 508–10 (2014) (discussing the “three basic prudential 
rules” required for standing:  that a litigant may only assert her own interests, that the 
courts “will decline to entertain cases based only on ‘generalized grievances,’” and that a 
suit must “fall within the ‘zone of interests’ protected by the relevant statute”). 
 79 Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 292 n.87 (1984). 
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reverses the entry of the injunction or the verdict.  Occasionally, the 
Court defines the relevant state action at a slightly higher level of 
generality, to include the lower court’s application of background pri-
vate law rules to the record facts to produce the contested injunction 
or verdict.  Only twice has the Court defined the relevant state action 
at a high enough level of generality to encompass abstract rule of pri-
vate law, and in these cases the Court found those abstract rules con-
stitutional. 80 
The Court’s pattern of defining state action as modestly as possi-
ble serves both the horizontal and vertical purposes that drive other 
prudential doctrines.  First, by confining its review to the precise ver-
dict before it, the Court leaves in place the abstract rules of private 
law that have been developed by institutions with designated authori-
ty to make law, either elected legislators or common law courts.  The 
modest definition of state action therefore prevents horizontal en-
croachment upon the function of lawmaking institutions.  Second, by 
limiting the boundaries of the state action under review, the Court 
avoids imposing federal government values beyond the minimum de-
gree necessary to satisfy constitutional requirements.  The modest 
definition of state action prevents vertical encroachment upon the 
state prerogative to develop law in accordance with its own prefer-
ences, and those of its subsidiary communities.81 
Thus, for example, Shelley defined the relevant state action as the 
entry of two specific injunctions premised on racially restrictive cove-
nants, found those actions unconstitutional, and reversed them.82  
The Court emphasized that state courts could not enforce such cove-
 
 80 See case cited supra notes 50–54 (explaining that the Court defined state action to include 
background rules of state contract law in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 
(1991)); see also cases cited supra notes 64–70 (explaining that the Court defined state ac-
tion to include background rules of trust law in Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 935 (1970)). 
 81 Although this Article is exclusively concerned with the Court’s use of state action to justify 
constitutional constraints on defamation and other dignitary torts, the proper scope of 
state action has implications for other public-private law conflicts.  For example, the in-
corporation of the Second Amendment against the states, at issue in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 762–63, 774–75 (2010), raises the possibility that tort verdicts re-
quiring gun owners to internalize damages associated with gun storage or gun use may be 
construed as state action infringing the right to keep and bear arms.  If so, the Court’s 
definition of the state action represented by this area of the law would dictate the degree 
of Court authority to wipe out state tort principles to make way for unfettered enjoyment 
of gun ownership.  So too with recent efforts to encourage chain restaurants to bar pa-
trons from carrying guns—if the private law of property that gives restaurant owners the 
right to eject gun carriers from the premises is construed as state action, the Court would 
have the authority to wipe out property law principles that support such anti-gun 
measures. 
 82 334 U.S. at 19–20, 23. 
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nants but it did not attempt to recast state rules of contract to prevent 
the use of the covenants.83  Instead, it left states and local communi-
ties to sort out the appropriate treatment of these instruments on 
their own.84  Evidence suggests that the simple prohibition on en-
forcement of the covenants, even without a constitutional common 
law of contract explicating a racial unconscionability doctrine, was 
sufficient to thwart the practice.85  In the years following Shelley, re-
strictive provisions in deeds were delegitimized86 and Congress passed 
legislation prospectively barring them.87  The prudential approach to 
defining state action in Shelley produced a clear constitutional signal 
but prevented the Court from trespassing on the lawmaking function 
or imposing its own values onto states and subsidiary communities. 
II.  STATE ACTION IN SULLIVAN 
The Court took a markedly different approach to defining state 
action in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which challenged a state def-
amation verdict.88  The prevailing view before Sullivan was that com-
mon law rules permitting individual plaintiffs to recover damages 
from defamatory speakers belonged entirely to private law, outside 
the sphere of federal constitutional concern.89  Sullivan 
 
 83 Id. at 22–23. 
 84 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19 (isolating judicial enforcement of the covenants as the problematic 
state action and intimating that if judicial enforcement were unavailable, minorities were 
likely to achieve “full enjoyment” of property rights “available to other members of the 
community”). 
 85 Motoko Rich, Restrictive Covenants Stubbornly Stay on the Books, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2005, at 
F1 (explaining that though it was procedurally complex to strike covenants that ran with 
the land and also included uncontroversial provisions such as fence height restrictions, 
real estate lawyers and title search companies began to strike out such covenants of their 
own accord; further, several states, including Missouri, Virginia and California have initi-
ated legislation to formally eliminate racially restrictive language from existing cove-
nants). 
 86 See id. 
 87 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2012) (making it unlawful to “discriminate against any person in the 
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling”). 
 88 376 U.S. at 256. 
 89 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 36–37 (1995).  
Notably, given their autonomy at the time to develop their own tort rules, some states had 
introduced speech-protective principles into the private law.  See CLIFTON O. LAWHORNE, 
DEFAMATION AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS:  THE EVOLVING LAW OF LIBEL 128 (1971) (discussing 
the liberal rule of libel law).  However, variation among the states was significant.  See id. 
at 209.  As of 1963, ten states applied the tort without limitations from any principles de-
signed to honor speakers’ rights.  See id. at 209–10 (discussing the history of state treat-
ment of freedom of discussion).  Twenty-two states had judicially recognized a privilege 
from defamation liability for speakers engaging in fair comment and criticism of public 
officials based on actual facts.  Id. at 128, 209.  Nineteen states had judicially recognized a 
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reconceptualized the private law defamation rules enforceable via the 
coercive power of the state as a proper subject of public law scrutiny.  
This Part outlines the background rules of libel in Alabama.  It then 
illustrates how the state jury and state courts applied them unconsti-
tutionally in Sullivan.  Finally, it examines how the Court departed 
from its usual prudential state action definition and practice to de-
fine the state action in Sullivan at a remarkably high level of generali-
ty, to include all of Alabama libel law.  Following this move, the Court 
reached into those background rules and rewrote them to privilege 
speech and subordinate reputation in cases brought by public offi-
cials.  In short, the Court’s non-prudential state action definition 
produced the horizontal latitude to make law and the vertical latitude 
to impose its values onto local communities. 
A.  The Alabama Libel Tort and the Proceeding Below 
In 1960, The New York Times published an issue advertisement 
submitted by the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the 
Struggle for Freedom in the South.90  The text of the ad recounted 
several key events in the civil rights movement, with two paragraphs 
focusing on incidents in Montgomery, Alabama.  L.B. Sullivan, the 
member of Montgomery’s elected three-commissioner government 
responsible for public safety (including oversight of the police de-
partment)91 sued the Times for libel, contending that his reputation 
was harmed by false statements in the ad regarding the conduct of 
Montgomery police.92  Among the complained-of falsehoods were 
that the police had “ringed” a local college campus to quell protest-
ers, when in fact they had come onto the campus but had not formed 
 
privilege from defamation liability for speakers who made misstatements of fact about 
public officials without malice.  Id.  Further, in states that conditioned privilege on an ab-
sence of malice, “malice” was defined in a variety of different ways—while Pennsylvania 
required a “studied and deliberate charge,” South Dakota looked only for “intent to in-
jure,” and many states, including Minnesota, did not define malice at all, saying only that 
a plaintiff could prove malice by showing the speaker knew the words were “false, if there 
was ill will or feeling, or if there was exaggeration in presentation . . . .”  Id. at 168–169.  
In short, there was no uniform agreement among the states that the tort had to account 
for speech imperatives, and even states that did try to balance reputation and speech 
struck that balance in very different ways. 
 90 Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South, 
Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960, at L25, available in ANTHONY LEWIS, 
MAKE NO LAW:  THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2–3 (1991). 
 91 KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN:  CIVIL RIGHTS, LIBEL 
LAW, AND THE FREE PRESS 11–12 (2011) (discussing Sullivan’s personal background and 
role as director of public safety). 
 92 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256–58 (1964). 
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a ring around it, that they had “padlocked” the campus dining hall to 
“starve the students into submission,” which had apparently not hap-
pened, that “police” had harassed King with frivolous arrests and that 
“Southern violators” had bombed his home.93  An Alabama jury found 
against the Times, awarding Sullivan $500,000 in undifferentiated 
compensatory and punitive damages.94  The trial court and the Ala-
bama Supreme Court both affirmed the jury’s verdict.95 
The Alabama libel tort at the time of Sullivan’s suit provided that 
a plaintiff could only recover for statements of fact that were “of and 
concerning” him.96  If such statements were found, and if they would 
“tend to injure a person . . . in his reputation or to bring him into 
public contempt,” for instance by “injur[ing] him in his public office, 
or imput[ing] misconduct to him in his office, or want of official in-
tegrity, or want of fidelity to a public trust,” they were libel per se and 
presumed to be false.97  Once libel per se had been established, “gen-
eral damages [were] presumed,” even if the plaintiff could not prove 
pecuniary injury resulted from the statement.98  However, Alabama 
law did not permit the award of punitive damages based on a pre-
sumption of injury alone; instead, it required a showing that the de-
fendant spoke with “actual malice.”99  Once a plaintiff had established 
all the elements of a libel per se, the defendant could prevail only by 
proving that the statements were true.100 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Analysis 
On review, the Supreme Court departed from its pattern of defin-
ing state action at a granular level.  Instead, it defined the state action 
under review at an unprecedentedly high level of generality, to in-
clude both the actual verdict and all of the abstract state private law 
libel rules underlying the verdict.  It declined to “insulate the judgment 
of the Alabama court from constitutional scrutiny” because it was the 
product of a private law allocation of rights and duties.101  It went on 
to observe that the Alabama courts were wielding “a state rule of law” 
 
 93 LEWIS, supra note 90, at 12 (outlining the respondent, L.B. Sullivan’s complaints and the 
newspaper’s subsequent response). 
 94 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 263 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 97 Id. at 267 (outlining Alabama libel law). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 262. 
100 Id. at 267. 
101 Id. at 265 (emphasis added). 
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which was alleged to have infringed upon constitutional rights.102  Af-
ter determining that both the judgment and the abstract body of libel 
law were state action, it analyzed the constitutionality of both the en-
forcement action and the abstract rules.  Ultimately, it both “re-
verse[d] the judgment” and “h[e]ld that the rule of law applied by 
the Alabama courts is constitutionally deficient.”103  The Court then 
supplied a new federal rule for libel cases and, rather than return the 
matter to the Alabama court for reexamination of the facts under the 
new scheme, disposed of the case itself, applying the scheme to the 
record facts to conclude that Sullivan could not prevail. 104 
In its constitutional analysis, the Court first purported to describe 
“Alabama law as applied in this case.”105 According to the Court, Ala-
bama law provided that statements indicating a public official lacked 
integrity in carrying out his duties were libel per se:  “[W]here the 
plaintiff is a public official his place in the governmental hierarchy is 
sufficient evidence to support a finding that his reputation has been 
affected by statements that reflect upon the agency of which he is in 
charge.”106  In other words, according to the Court, Alabama law pro-
vided that statements about municipal employees were considered to 
identify the officials who oversaw those municipal departments, and 
thus satisfied the crucial “of and concerning” element of defama-
tion.107  Notably, “this rule of liability” was not an accurate statement 
of the abstract defamation law in Alabama.  While the state supreme 
court was willing to find that statements about the police were state-
ments about Sullivan, there was no Alabama rule of law requiring that 
result.  In essence, the Supreme Court recategorized the state judicial 
application of the “of and concerning rule” to these facts as an abstract 
rule of law. 
Further, the Court said that in Alabama, once libel per se had 
been established, truth was the defendant’s only recourse; general 
 
102 Id. (emphasis added). 
103 Id. at 264.  The Times’s attorney, Herbert Wechsler, recognized that the Court would 
have to clear the state action hurdle in order to reach the First Amendment ground on 
which he preferred to contest the Alabama verdict, and Sullivan had explicitly argued in 
his brief to the Court that the Alabama rules of law were not state action.  See David A. 
Anderson, Wechsler’s Triumph, 66 ALA. L. REV. 229, 237 nn.54–56 (2014).  Wechsler treated 
the argument “dismissively,” by grouping the Sullivan verdict with other state judicial or-
ders the Court had recently denominated state action.  Wechsler glossed over the fact 
that those ostensibly comparable cases involved the courts’ authority to issue contempt ci-
tations and to enforce verdicts and were therefore inapposite.  Id. at 238 n.60. 
104 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 284–88. 
105 Id. at 267. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 263. 
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damages were presumed even without evidence of injury; a showing 
of ill intent was required for the imposition of punitive damages; and 
a showing of good motives did not foreclose the imposition of puni-
tive damages, but only mitigated them.108  The Court then defined the 
question in the case as “whether this rule of liability”—essentially, the 
entire Alabama libel tort—was constitutional.109 
The Court answered that question by articulating a set of defama-
tion rules that would carve out of private law a safe harbor for speech 
on public issues, and worked backwards from that ideal rule to see if 
Alabama defamation law complied.  Specifically, the Court an-
nounced that in libel actions brought by public officials, the Constitu-
tion required that “[the] public official [cannot] recover[] damages 
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he 
proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was 
false or not.”110  In essence, the Court’s holding in Sullivan devised a 
bright-line, speech-protective rule for finding actual malice, an ele-
ment that was key to many state defamation schemes, but that was 
given widely different substantive and procedural meaning by each 
jurisdiction.111  For instance, Alabama had required proof of “actual 
malice” in defamation actions, but only as a prerequisite to recover-
ing punitive damages.112  Further, Alabama’s version of “actual mal-
ice” was designed to capture general ill will, and therefore juries were 
instructed that any intent to defame could satisfy the “actual malice” 
standard.113  The Court determined that Alabama’s flexible common-
law standard for actual malice, restricted to the evaluation of plain-
tiff’s entitlement to punitive damages, was inconsistent with the fed-
eral requirement.  It was therefore unconstitutional, and was re-
placed by the new federal constitutional rule.  The Court proceeded 
to apply that rule to the evidence contained in the record of the case 
and rendered a new verdict:  “the proof presented to show actual 
 
108 Id. at 267. 
109 Id. at 268. 
110 Id. at 279–80.  Notably, the practical effect of the Court’s decision was to supply the 
standard of “actual malice.”  Alabama had in the past allowed juries to find intent and 
award punitive damages when the jury found that the speaker was more than negligent 
and circumstances suggested intent to defame, id. at 262, but the Court issued a rule dic-
tating that “intent” to defame existed only where the speaker knew he was circulating a 
falsehood or recklessly disregarded that possibility.  Id. at 279–80. 
111 See supra note 89. 
112 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283. 
113 See, e.g., Johnson Publ’g Co. v. Davis, 124 So. 2d 441, 450 (Ala. 1960). 
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malice lacks the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard 
demands . . .” and the judgment was reversed.114 
The Court’s state action definition was a subtle but crucial move 
that yielded the unprecedented degree of remedial authority on dis-
play in the remainder of the opinion.  If the Court had approached 
Sullivan as it approached other constitutional challenges to private 
law verdicts, it would have done one of three things: (1) defined the 
relevant state action as the verdict alone and refused to enforce the 
verdict if it represented a message-oriented imposition on speech 
(without reaching into state private law principles and rewriting them 
to avoid future instances of speech inhibition) as in Shelley and Peter-
son; (2) defined the relevant state action as the jury’s and courts’ ap-
plication of the Alabama defamation elements to the facts and  re-
manded for a more constitutionally scrupulous application of those 
principles (again without reaching into state private law principles 
and rewriting them), as in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.;115 or (3) 
defined the relevant state action as the entirety of the background 
private law of defamation and then asked whether it was designed to 
achieve a neutral state interest or was designed to achieve an imper-
missible speech abridgment (reaching into state private law but pre-
suming constitutionality so long it was not designed specifically to 
achieve an impermissible end) as in Evans v. Abney and Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co.116 
 
114 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285–86. 
115 458 U.S. 886 (1982).  Notably, after replacing Alabama’s defamation scheme with its own, 
the Court indicated that the traditional and modest state action analysis would also have 
justified reversing the verdict.  Following state action approach (2) above, the Court ob-
served that the jury and judges had misapplied the existing Alabama rule of law that the 
statement must be “of and concerning” the plaintiff.  The evidence on that element was 
“constitutionally defective” because it did not support the jury’s finding that the state-
ments in the ad were “of and concerning” Sullivan.  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 288.  It noted 
that the Alabama Supreme Court had found the statements to satisfy that element be-
cause it is “common knowledge” that fire and police departments are under the control 
of officials, so that criticisms of the department employees amount to criticism of the offi-
cials.  Id. at 263.  The Court then directed that “such a proposition may not constitution-
ally be utilized to establish that an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental opera-
tions was a libel of an official responsible for those operations.”  Id. at 292. 
116 Abney and Cohen suggest that rules of neutral design (those not calculated to infringe a 
constitutional right but to achieve some other legitimate state goal) are presumed consti-
tutional absent a biased application.  Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991); 
Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).  Although the jury in Sullivan undoubtedly applied 
the Alabama rules in bad faith to infringe a constitutional right, the rules themselves were 
arguably neutral because they did not “single out” the press or individual speakers to pre-
vent publication of particular content; rather, they singled out injuries caused by circula-
tion of falsehoods regardless of the specific content of the falsehood.  The Alabama libel 
tort was not an ex ante law designed to foreclose select messages unlike, say “food libel” 
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The first two of those state action approaches had the capacity to 
yield the same result for the New York Times (operating on the untest-
ed assumption that the Alabama players would have acted in good 
faith on remand).  But neither of these approaches would not have 
allowed the Court to reach into the abstract rules of private law and 
recast them to its own liking.  Departing from the unarticulated pru-
dential practice of conceptualizing state action narrowly, the Court 
deliberately defined state action in a way that aggrandized its remedi-
al authority.  This broad definition resulted in exactly the separation 
of powers and federalism excesses that prudential principles in the 
Article III context are designed to prevent.  In Sullivan and dozens of 
cases that followed, the Court used its newly located authority over 
dignitary tort to displace the existing private law and to impose a rad-
ically different uniform national scheme.117 
 
laws, which were adopted explicitly to allow punishment of speech harmful to a specific 
constituency.  But see Howard M. Wasserman, Two Degrees of Speech Protection:  Free Speech 
Through the Prism of Agricultural Disparagement Laws, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 323, 345, 
374–75 (2000) (suggesting that both food libel laws and general defamation causes of ac-
tion are content-based restrictions).  Dignitary tort law generally is agnostic as to what 
types of messages will attach liability or what kinds of plaintiffs are entitled to compensa-
tion for dignitary injury.  The elements in these torts that evaluate the content of speech 
(“defamatoriness” in defamation, “outrageousness” in IIED, and “offensiveness” in publi-
cation of private facts) do not supply any rules about approved or disapproved messages.  
Instead, they indicate that for each tort, whether the content of the speech is sufficiently 
injurious to have invaded the plaintiff’s legally protected interest in reputation, emotion-
al well-being or privacy will be determined with reference to community norms.  See infra 
note 127.  As a result, they can plausibly be described as “neutral” in design, though some 
would disagree. 
117 See David A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 755, 784 
(2004) (discussing how “speech-tort conflicts become rules of constitutional law, not tort 
law”).  As Anderson suggests, the progressive constitutionalization of dignitary tort law is 
reflected in many cases following Sullivan.  See, e.g., Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 
130 (1967) (applying Sullivan requirements to public figures in addition to public offi-
cials); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (applying the actual malice requirement to 
the false light invasion of privacy tort); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (re-
quiring plaintiff to prove actual malice by showing that the defendant knew or had seri-
ous doubts about the truth of his statement); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 
U.S. 6 (1970) (barring recovery for rhetorical hyperbole); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323 (1974) (requiring private plaintiffs to show actual malice in order to recover 
presumed or punitive damages); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) 
(shifting from defendant to plaintiff the burden of proving a statement false); Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (applying the actual malice requirement to 
the IIED tort); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991) (barring recov-
ery for misquotations that do not materially alter the speaker’s meaning). 
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III. SULLIVAN AND THE CLASH OF COMMUNITIES 
Why did the Justices depart so drastically in Sullivan from their 
prudential state action pattern?  The orthodox answer is that the 
Court considered speech (and the civil rights context of the case) suf-
ficiently special that it justified the strong medicine of Sullivan.  But 
on closer examination, it does not appear that a love of speech alone 
is a satisfactory explanation for the state action departure in Sullivan.  
A better explanation may be that Sullivan for the first time offered 
the Court a chance to provide a legal framework for weighing the 
relative priority of local communities and the national community 
when the two were in conflict and the Constitution offered no clear 
hierarchy between them. 
A. Debunking the Intuitive Explanations for the Anomaly 
The simplest and most obvious explanation for the Court’s deci-
sion to define state action broadly and thus maximize its leverage to 
change those rules is that speech deserves special protection.  This 
explanation is certainly plausible; many theorists consider uncontro-
versial the assertion that “speech is special.”118  However, this explana-
tion is not entirely satisfactory if Sullivan and its progeny are synthe-
sized with comparable cases involving constitutional challenges to 
private law actions. 
In a number of those cases, private law interests have pressured 
speech and the Court has nevertheless defined state action at a gran-
ular level, limiting its remedial leverage.  In Peterson v. City of Green-
ville, where private law property concepts undergirding the state law 
of trespass sat opposite the rights of civil rights protesters to stage sit-
ins, the Court defined state action to include just the trespass convic-
tions and left undisturbed the private law of property that allowed li-
ability for speakers who brought their message onto private do-
mains.119  Too, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., where the right of 
a business owner to sue for malicious interference with his commerce 
sat opposite the rights of civil rights protesters to carry out a boycott, 
the Court defined the relevant state action as the application of tort 
principles to the specific facts of the case and remanded for recon-
sideration in light of a gentle reminder about the value of speech, 
without suggesting that the malicious interference tort itself was in 
 
118 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 991 (1997). 
119 373 U.S. 244, 247–48 (1963). 
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need of revision.120  Finally, in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the Court 
permitted application of promissory estoppel principles even though 
that decision had the speech-abridging potential to punish a newspa-
per for revealing an anonymous source.121  Nevertheless, the Court 
defined the relevant state action as the neutral application of promis-
sory estoppel rules to the facts at hand and thus sacrificed the consti-
tutional leverage to promulgate a constitutional rule shaping promis-
sory estoppel analysis to protect the news media from liability. 
The compelling civil rights background of Sullivan the case is a se-
cond intuitive explanation for the Court’s singular state action analy-
sis in the case.  But it, too, falls short.  In Shelley and Barrows, the 
Court addressed the ugly and not uncommon practice of private re-
strictive covenants designed to create all-white enclaves in local 
neighborhoods, and it restricted its state action analysis to the three 
contracts before it.122  Consequently, when it found the injunctions 
and damage award enforcing those contracts unconstitutional, it 
simply reversed or affirmed them in a binary fashion.123  But because 
it did not sweep within its review the entirety of the state private law 
of contract that gave rise to the covenants, it left those principles un-
disturbed.  It could have declared as a matter of private contract law 
that such instruments were per se unconscionable, which would have 
been the contract result most analogous to the Court’s holding in Sul-
livan that Alabama’s libel scheme (and any others like it) was uncon-
stitutional and thus displaced.124  It did not. 
The Peterson and Bell trespass cases were also outgrowths of the civ-
il rights movement, both finding protesters to have trespassed on pri-
 
120 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933–34 (1982).  See also Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578–79 (1977) (holding that the tort protected 
a person’s commercial interests in his act so that liability was warranted even if it was a 
speech abridgment, where a man sued a local television news station under the invasion 
of privacy tort for filming and broadcasting his “human cannonball” act). 
121 501 U.S. 663, 668–69 (1991).  The inconsistency in application of the First Amendment to 
contract-based challenges to speech and tort-based challenges to speech has been docu-
mented, with predictions that the two lines of authority must eventually collide and be re-
solved.  See Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1653 (2009) (noting the “dramatic difference” between the 
First Amendment’s treatments of contract and of tort). 
122 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 251–54 
(1953). 
123 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 12–14; Barrows, 346 U.S. at 260. 
124 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964).  Functionally, these holdings 
were sufficient to make the practice unappealing to parties.  Shelley is often said to have 
“prohibited” racially restrictive covenants; however, Shelley explicitly did not prohibit 
them, but it did not have to encroach on state private law prerogatives to achieve the in-
strumental goal of discouraging the practice.  Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20. 
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vate property.  But the state action in Peterson was restricted to the in-
dividual trespass convictions, and the Court in Bell declined to even 
find the convictions to be state action.125  Finally, in NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co., the Court defined the relevant state action as 
the application of private law malicious interference principles to the 
specific facts of the civil rights boycott involved in the case, reversed 
the judgment insofar as it applied to respondents it found to have 
engaged in expression but not violence, and remanded for applica-
tion of those rules to select respondents who appeared to have used 
or threatened violence in light of a gentle reminder about constitu-
tional values.126  It did not, however, define the state action to include 
the entirety of the malicious interference tort, and was therefore un-
able to employ any constitutional authority to displace that state tort 
rule. 
In short, if enthusiasm for speech or for civil rights were the only 
factors influencing the Court’s state action approach in mediating 
the clash between private law and public law, all cases where speech 
or civil rights sat opposite a private law interest would be expected to 
feature a highly generalized definition of the relevant state action 
and a rewrite of the private law to privilege speech and subordinate 
the private law interest.  But that has not resulted.  So the interests sit-
ting on the public law side of the ledger—speech or civil rights—do 
not seem to be the crucial factor leading to the Court’s anomalous 
treatment of state action in the Sullivan line of cases. 
B.  The Community-Centered Explanation for Sullivan 
The private law system involved in the case best explains the 
Court’s doctrinal departure.  The dignitary torts are unique in their 
explicit invocation of community values to determine the defendant’s 
liability.127  Sociologists define community to include groups with a 
 
125 See Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 245 (1963); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 
226, 241 (1964).  Christopher Schmidt has observed that while the Court first started tak-
ing cases challenging the constitutionality of segregationists’ various tactics in order to 
thwart the civil rights movement, the Court gradually adopted a more flexible approach 
to state action precisely to permit wider application of constitutional principles to actors 
other than elected officials.  He describes Bell as the failure of this state action “revolu-
tion.”  Christopher W. Schmidt, The Sit-ins and the Failed State Action Revolution 19 (May 12, 
2008) (Am. Bar Found. Working Paper).  
126 458 U.S. at 915–16 & 916 n.51, 924–34. 
127 Property and contract feature largely objective rules and other tort actions smuggle in 
subjective community values at most indirectly, for example via reference to “reasonable-
ness” in negligence.  The dignitary causes of action, in contrast, all delegate to the com-
munity the job of determining whether particular speech events have inflicted negative 
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common nucleus of practice as well as a common geographic circum-
stance.128  While “community” had a fairly stable and unitary meaning 
throughout most of the history of the dignitary torts, by 1964 the 
term failed to adequately account for the complex network of social 
organizations in the United States.  In addition to the paradigmatic 
homogenous agrarian community that had provided dignitary tort 
norms since the founding, by the mid-twentieth century, the United 
States was also home to diverse urban communities, professional and 
commercial communities, and—thanks to technological innovations 
such as telegraphs, telephones, televisions, automobiles, airplanes, 
and industrial printing presses—a national community had also coa-
lesced.  As a result, the unsupervised use of such an open-ended met-
ric of wrongfulness empowered juries from discrete and insular 
communities to apply their values to punish speech that might be 
considered acceptable by other subsidiary communities or by the na-
tional community.  So Sullivan’s state action analysis and the at-
tendant federalization of dignitary tort law may be best explained as 
an effort to constitutionally subordinate local communities to the na-
tional community in the private law context where they were most 
likely to conflict.  This hypothesis is borne out both by history and by 
the Court’s own language in this line of cases. 
 
externalities that trigger, under local norms, a compensatory obligation on the part of 
the speaker.  For instance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts specifies, “To create liabil-
ity for defamation there must be . . . a false and defamatory statement concerning anoth-
er . . . .” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977).  The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts also defines “defamatory communication” as tending “to harm the reputation of 
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from as-
sociating or dealing with him.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1977) (emphasis 
added).  The intentional infliction of emotional distress tort requires that the defendant 
exhibit “extreme and outrageous conduct,” defined as behavior that, when recounted “to an 
average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead 
him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”   Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1977) (emphasis 
added).  The privacy tort of public disclosure of private facts specifies, “One who gives 
publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the 
other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that . . . would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and . . . is not of legitimate concern to the pub-
lic.”   Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977).  The Restatement specifically says 
that “The protection afforded to the plaintiff’s interest in his privacy must be relative to the 
customs of the time and place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors and 
fellow citizens.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. c (1977) (emphasis added). 
128 See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART:  INDIVIDUALISM AND 
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 28 (1st ed. 1985); David B. Clark, The Concept of Com-
munity:  A Re-Examination, 21 SOC. REV. 397–8 (1973). 
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1.  The Two-Tiered Notion of Community in the United States 
In the pre-industrial, agrarian, patriarchal, and religious era, one 
was more likely to find homogeneity among large groups of people, a 
state of being denoted as Gemeinschaft.129  “In the pre-modern world, 
knowledge about how one should live—that is, ethical knowledge 
about what constitutes ‘the good life’—was derived from the struc-
tures of tradition and, especially, religion that dominated communi-
ties.”130  Because these communities depended on social cohesion and 
because participation in the mercantile economy depended on one’s 
personal reputation, defamation was a crucial device for vindicating 
reputational slights in a peaceful forum. 
In contrast, the post-Industrial age saw the emergence of a 
Gesellschaft community, where social bonds are “impersonal and spe-
cialized.”131  “The fundamental source of knowledge about the physi-
cal and human world [in these communities is] reason—that is, the 
capacity of individual human beings to know truth through inde-
pendent and critical thought.”132  Because rational thinking and the 
maximization of knowledge are valued in Gesellschaft communities, 
the freedom of individuals to express and receive ideas via free 
speech is prized. 
During the late eighteenth century, the United States can be de-
scribed as a collection of largely Gemeinschaft communities.  Most 
states allowed common law causes of action for defamation during 
the early years of the Republic, and this tort scheme was not seen as 
inconsistent with either state or federal constitutional protections for 
free press or free speech.133  Further, during this period, speech was 
either conducted face-to-face, via personal letters, or in newspapers 
that tended to circulate locally.134  Thus, most dignitary tort causes of 
action during the early period of the Republic were inherently con-
 
129 See LAWRENCE MCNAMARA, REPUTATION AND DEFAMATION 24 (2007) (describing the theo-
ries of German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies). 
130 Id. at 23. 
131 Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV.  433, 501 (2011). 
132 MCNAMARA, supra note 129, at 23. 
133 See Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions When 
the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868:  What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American His-
tory and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 43–46 (2008) (describing how a huge number of 
states explicitly contemplated libel suits in their state constitutions). 
134 See Andrew J. King, The Law of Slander in Early Antebellum America, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 
7 (1991) (explaining that slander, which “regulated face-to-face interaction in small 
communities,” was far more prevalent in the nineteenth century than libel, which typical-
ly involved conflicts between rival politicians). 
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tained within cohesive local communities with shared practices and 
shared norms.135 
The emergence of the Gesellschaft community in the United States 
coincided with the introduction of industrialized printing presses, 
telegraphs, telephones, radios, and televisions.136  Further, it coincid-
ed with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, which rein-
forced the primacy of national values over local values in some con-
texts.137  Thus, the emergence of a national, individualistic, liberal 
democratic ethos was symbiotic with the flourishing of mass-produced 
national speech. 
This tension in the notion of “community” may go a long way in 
explaining the Court’s radical state action analysis in Sullivan and the 
resulting constitutionalization of the dignitary torts.138  Geographic 
 
135 See, e.g., LAWHORNE, supra note 89, at 174 (noting that of those considered “public offi-
cials” with limited recourse to defamation in the pre-Sullivan years, most were state and 
local officials:  grand juror, city inspector, city street superintendent, prison warden, po-
liceman, mental institution superintendent, poorhouse manager, and state oil inspector.  
Only one listed was a federal official whose work would have an impact across state lines, 
an agency secretary). 
136 See generally NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN:  AN INTERPRETIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 141–42 (1986) (explaining the rise of fast communication 
devices). 
137 In fact, one of the underlying purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment can be described 
as an imposition of privileged cultural values (those of the northern states, which were 
less agrarian and more impersonal) over disfavored values (those of the southern states, 
which were more agrarian and interconnected) through the structural privileging of the 
federal government over the state governments. Robert Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485, 499 (2003) (“The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . re-
alized that the right to the Equal Protection of the Laws would require courts to impose 
the cultural values of the North upon the South.”).  While this rebalancing allowed the 
central government to impose cultural norms of liberal egalitarian rights via constitution-
al adjudication of provisions like the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment does 
not allow for the law to resolve cultural conflicts in public discourse by enforcing “cultur-
al norms.”  Id.  Post seems to be suggesting that top-down imposition of nationalized 
norms entrenched in the Fourteenth Amendment is inconsistent with a liberal democrat-
ic reading of the First Amendment (not, of course, the only possible theory that can be 
used to interpret the Constitution).  See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Classical Liberal Constitution or 
Classical Liberal Construction? 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 808, 824–25 (2014) (explaining Rich-
ard Epstein’s view of the Constitution).  But Post does not foreclose the possibility that 
bottom-up signaling of the norms of local, non-governmental communities via the com-
mon law is consistent with the First Amendment.  See id. at 824 (discussing the norms sur-
rounding the interpretation of the Constitution). 
138 See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Justice Scalia, Originalism, and the First Amendment, HUFFINGTON 
POST (OCT. 13, 2011, 7:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/justice-
scalia-originalis_b_1009944.html (reporting Justice Scalia’s contention, at an Aspen Insti-
tute conference, that the Court-legislated press protections in Sullivan were not com-
pelled by the Constitution).  Stone suggested the disconnect between national norms (os-
tensibly represented by the Times’s approach to the story) and Alabama norms 
(represented by the jury verdict for Sullivan) was the key dynamic motivating the Court’s 
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communities have long been assigned responsibility for determining 
norm-based wrongfulness in the dignitary torts because they share 
history, geography, weather, cultural and civic institutions, and edu-
cational and charitable endeavors.  This common nucleus of experi-
ence and practice means that “community” members are positioned 
to understand what behavior is expected of participants based on 
what the community has jointly emphasized as important.  For in-
stance, calling a plaintiff a “scab” might be seen as defamatory in a lo-
cality like Detroit, which has a high concentration of union members, 
whereas it might not be defamatory in a right-to-work state where un-
ion membership has little social support.139 
Dignitary tort law is premised on the legitimacy of the Gemeinschaft 
community, whereas the liberal democratic theory that drives much 
of modern First Amendment jurisprudence is premised on the legit-
imacy of the Gesellschaft community.  In Sullivan, the tort explicitly in-
voked “community” norms to determine wrongfulness, revealing a 
fault line in tort between Gemeinschaft norms and Gesellschaft norms. 
Where a plaintiff suing for dignitary tort asks a geographically lo-
cal jury to apply its notions of wrongfulness to national speech, the 
imposition of “community” values may vault geographically and mor-
ally discrete (Gemeinschaft) communities over the national 
(Gesellschaft) community for purposes of constructing speech norms.  
The moralistic and often religious cohesion of subsidiary local com-
munities raises the possibility that speech considered acceptable by a 
national majority or acceptable within some subsidiary communities 
 
decision.  Id. (“This was a lawsuit in Alabama, decided under Alabama law by an Alabama 
jury. The New York legislature was completely powerless to affect the matter in any way.  
It was precisely this fact that made a constitutional decision necessary. It’s bad enough 
that Alabama wants to censor what its own citizens can read, but what the situation in 
New York Times v. Sullivan demonstrated was that the nation cannot constitutionally al-
low each state to censor speech on its own, because in a national marketplace of ideas 
censorship in one state effectively precludes the press from distributing news to people 
nationally.  Although only a few hundred copies of that issue of the New York Times actual-
ly found their way into Alabama, that gave Alabama sufficient leverage to impose a huge 
penalty on the Times that was designed to deter it from writing negative stories about the 
South generally.”). 
139 Absent a jury instruction to the contrary, dignitary torts will almost inevitably be decided 
with reference to local community norms because the vicinage requirement draws jurors 
from a geographically compact area within which the case is being litigated.  Indeed, the 
basis for the vicinage requirement is that jurors discharge their duties in part by using the 
“assorted store of information [they] acquire[] about [their] neighborhood[s] by living 
there—local community customs, problems and affairs, local geography—and the jurors’ 
contacts with other community members . . . .” Dale W. Broeder, The Impact of the Vicinage 
Requirement:  An Empirical Look, 45 NEB. L. REV. 99, 101 (1966) (finding that “[j]uror 
knowledge of local conditions played a part in the decisions reached in ten of the four-
teen civil cases” studied). 
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will be denominated as wrongful by the norms of the particular 
community within which the tort is adjudicated.140  Thus, where the 
configuration of a plaintiff and a defendant results in a Gesellschaft v. 
Gemeinschaft community conflict, the Court seemed to fear that 
nothing in tort doctrine would prevent local juries from using their 
“community” discretion to override national speech values.141 
This fear seems to be a plausible explanation for the Court’s self-
aggrandizing definition of the state action under review in Sullivan.  
By defining the relevant state action at a high level of generality, the 
Court was able to do two things:  first, it clearly signaled that in a 
clash between national community values and subsidiary community 
values, national values should prevail; second, it operationalized that 
rule (in Sullivan and dozens of subsequent cases) by promulgating 
the quasi-legislative constitutional scheme that would divert to public 
law treatment most cases where subsidiary communities might punish 
 
140 See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation and the Myth of Community, 71 WASH. 
L. REV. 1, 41 (1996) (“[The use of the ‘community’ concept to assess the wrongfulness of 
speech-inflicted injuries] fails to comport with the complex reality of modern community 
life.  The vision of community underpinning defamation law is based on a very simple, 
traditional model of social life—a model that is contrary to the prevailing forms of social 
interaction in American society.  It is possible to speak of widespread consensus only in 
small, closely knit, and relatively homogeneous communities (if they exist).  In contrast, 
American society might be described as a community of subcommunities, undergoing a 
constant process of formation and reformation.”).  Thus, the call for civility via dignitary 
tort verdicts “may mask a desire to suppress dialogue that seems threatening to the estab-
lished social order.”  See id. at 41 n.239.  
141 If so, the Court’s fears may have been overblown.  Tort does feature internal limits that 
prevent it from becoming a wholesale tool of public policy (a feature that is seen as a 
blessing by some tort theorists and an obstacle to others).  See, e.g., Rustad, supra note 131, 
at 475–77 (summarizing internal tort limits such as the requirement of substantive stand-
ing, the refusal to recognize unrealized injuries, and reluctance to award damages for 
emotional and economic harm).  Notably, Alabama tort doctrine already did include two 
elements that should have prevented local jury override of national values.  First, the “of 
and concerning” element of Alabama law required the plaintiff to prove substantive 
standing to contest the national speech.  See supra note 89 and accompanying text.  Se-
cond, under Alabama law the jury was required to explicitly find that the Times had acted 
with “malice” in order to award punitive damages. See supra note 99 and accompanying 
text.  Conceptualizing the relevant state action to include the verdict alone would have al-
lowed the Court to police the jury’s application of these elements and overturn the ver-
dict for failure to abide by them.  Interestingly, the civil recourse theory of torts has noted 
in response to complaints that tort has been manipulated as a tool for achieving public 
policy ends that internal limits within tort doctrine, if applied properly, prevent the use of 
tort as a species of public law.  See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as 
Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 945–46 (2010).  Specifically, Professors Goldberg and 
Zipursky have noted that tort has internal “standing” requirements that prevent its use by 
plaintiffs who have not sustained an actual injury.  The “of and concerning” requirement 
is the internal standing limit that should have ensured the defamation tort could not be 
used by the Alabama jury as an at-large device for punishing the Times’s speech. 
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significant speech.  Thus, by ignoring the prudential practice of de-
fining state action modestly, the Court reached horizontally into the 
legislative prerogative to devise rules that balance public welfare and 
speech rights, and reached vertically into the states’ prerogative to 
develop tort law in accord with their unique cultures.  The promise of 
Sullivan is found in the Court’s signal that subsidiary communities 
may not dictate national speech norms.  But the reason that promise 
has not been entirely fulfilled may be found in the imprudent state 
action analysis that authorized the Court’s horizontal and vertical ex-
cesses. 
IV.  THE COURT’S DIGNITARY TORT LAWMAKING 
In the two decades following Sullivan, the Court overreached hor-
izontally into the legislative domain, fashioning an entirely new 
scheme to govern defamation, privacy,142 and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress causes of action.143 The Court’s exertions were de-
cidedly more legislative than adjudicatory in nature.  The lawmaking 
endeavor is typically marked by the development of general rules by a 
body that has autonomy to identify problems it will address and to de-
fine the “breadth and severity”144 of those problems as it wishes, after 
whatever investigation or factfinding it elects to conduct, subject only 
to eventual response by voters.145  Adjudication, on the other hand, is 
marked by “particularized administration of justice in individual cas-
es,”146 in reaction to problems identified and bounded by the dispu-
tants.147  In this instance, however, the Court’s actions have all the 
earmarks of legislating:  it developed general rules to govern future 
cases after having defined the breadth and the severity of the social 
problem generally, far beyond the boundaries that had been identi-
fied by the parties.  Specifically, it designed a scheme that is quasi-
 
142 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 380, 386 (1967) (addressing the right to privacy for a 
public figure). 
143 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56–57 (1988) (limiting the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress tort for public figures).  While using “falsity” as a basis for 
distinguishing between intent to speak and intent to injure may be workable for the false 
light invasion of privacy tort, it is not a good fit for the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress tort, where even true speech may be deemed so outrageous for contextual rea-
sons that it is intolerable and therefore subject to liability. 
144 Thomas D. Barton, Common Law and its Substitutes:  The Allocation of Social Problems to Alter-
native Decisional Institutions, 63 N.C. L. REV. 519, 521 (1985). 
145 See Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 299–300 
(1992). 
146 Id. at 266. 
147 Barton, supra note 144, at 521–22. 
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statutory in nature, establishing ex ante categories of plaintiffs and 
categories of wrongfulness that, when cross-referenced, dictate the 
appropriate rule of liability.  This categorical scheme was designed to 
protect democratically important speech while preserving a plaintiff 
remedy for speech that is less significant or more injurious.  However, 
the inconsistency and imprecision of the scheme it produced reflect 
the perils of straying outside its area of institutional competence.148 
A. The Court’s Categorical Scheme 
The Court’s dignitary tort rules are both substantive and proce-
dural in nature.  The most important substantive rule created one le-
gal category for “public” plaintiffs and a separate category for “pri-
vate” plaintiffs.  Although falsehood is an element in all defamation 
claims, the Court added to the “falsehood” element for public plain-
tiffs a stringent scienter requirement.  Specifically, to recover for any 
of these dignitary torts, public plaintiffs must show that speakers had 
“actual malice,” defined as knowledge that their statements are false 
or reckless disregard of that possibility.149  Private plaintiffs also must 
prove the defendants’ scienter, but at the lower threshold of negli-
gence150 (unless seeking punitive damages, which require actual mal-
ice151).152 
Further, to bolster the requirement that defendants in public 
plaintiff cases must have actual malice, and the requirement that the 
complained-of speech be false, the Court overhauled the procedural 
framework for defamation and the related torts.  Specifically, plain-
tiffs must show the speaker’s scienter by clear and convincing proof,153 
and the reviewing court must review the scienter finding de novo ra-
ther than for clear error.154  Most important, defamation plaintiffs 
 
148 Notably, unlike a legislature, the Court does not have the ability to undertake any 
factfinding to confirm its intuitions about the scope of a problem, and is not accountable 
to any other branch or constituency that may object to its efforts. 
149 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). 
150 Id. at 349–50. 
151 Id. 
152 In addition to from introducing a public-private distinction, the Court also changed the 
calculus for a “defamatory” statement.  As a matter of law, rhetorical hyperbole, Green-
belt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970), opinion, Milkovich v. Lorain 
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1990), and immaterial misquotations, Masson v. New 
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 524 (1991), cannot be the basis for a successful def-
amation claim. 
153 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285–286 (1964). 
154 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 492 (1984). 
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must now prove the statement to be false, rather than the defendant 
shouldering the burden to prove it true.155 
These rules essentially establish a constitutional matrix.156  The na-
ture of the plaintiff operates as an objective proxy for the constitu-
tional significance of the contested speech.  Statements about a pub-
lic official or public figure are thought to represent democratically or 
civically relevant speech, whereas statements about purely private fig-
ures are thought to represent speech of insignificant democratic or 
civic value and can expose the declarant to tort liability more freely.157  
Further, the scienter categories operate as objective proxies for the 
likelihood that the speaker’s words were calculated primarily to circu-
late a message rather than to inflict injury.  Statements that are know-
ingly or recklessly false are presumed to have been motivated by in-
tent to injure whereas statements that are just negligently false reflect 
intent to circulate a message.  These categories of plaintiff status and 
defendant scienter work in tandem so that plaintiffs suing for speech 
presumed to be of democratic or civic value must demonstrate a level 
of scienter on the defendant’s part indicating the speech was more 
injury-oriented than message-oriented.  This categorical scheme was 
meant to ensure that democratically important speech intended to 
enlighten rather than to injure could not be the basis for an award of 
money damages.  In other words, the scheme is meant to create per 
se constitutional “breathing room” for certain favored kinds of 
speech.158 
 
155 Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986). 
156 Others have used this term.  See, e.g., Citron & Franks, supra note 1, at 375 n.189; Rodney 
A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Roiling Sea of Free Speech Doctrine and Principle:  
A Methodological Critique of United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV. 499, 502 n.26 (2013). 
157 See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343–45 (explaining that Sullivan was designed to accommodate 
the press interest in protection from liability for circulating robust speech with the state 
interest in protecting the reputation of various individuals from injury, and that in order 
to avoid case-by-case review of specific verdicts, the Court laid down rules that would 
strike the appropriate balance by treating the category of public plaintiffs less protectively 
than the category of private plaintiffs in light of the different speech-reputation policies 
at play for the different plaintiff categories);  see also Smolla, supra note 156, at 511–13. 
158 Notably, the Court’s detailed dignitary tort rules, designed as a national scheme to re-
place a variety of state defamation and dignitary tort rules, look suspiciously like the “fed-
eral general common law” ostensibly prohibited in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 
78 (1938).  To be sure, Erie reserved a power for the Court to supervise the judicial action 
of the states when authorized by the Constitution to do so.  But the negative command of 
the First Amendment bars the promulgation of positive law shaping speech.  By replacing 
problematic state rules of tort with its own rules of tort, one might say that the Court has 
used a constitutional prohibition on the development of speech law as a pretext for de-
veloping speech law.  Of course, constitutional interpretation remains the clear province 
of the Court even after Erie.  But scholars have acknowledged that “interpretation” can 
almost imperceptibly morph into “promulgation” of common law in constitutional cloth-
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B.  The Pitfalls of Constitutional Legislating 
The Court’s foremost goal in establishing constitutional categories 
for these torts was to distinguish neatly between speech entitled to 
public law protections and speech that should remain subject to pri-
vate law.  But the post-Sullivan dignitary tort cases are an object lesson 
in the Court’s legislative inexperience.  While the Court has elegantly 
articulated the need to balance speech and dignity, the rules it has 
promulgated are inconsistent and imprecise. 
1. Inconsistency. 
The Court’s drawn-out effort to perfect a constitutional dignitary 
tort scheme has been plagued by indecision about how to distinguish 
between plaintiffs who must proceed under the public law protec-
tions and those who may remain within private law.  The Court has 
also been unclear about whether different defendants are to be fun-
neled into different parts of the constitutional matrix. 
The Court’s dignitary tort project began simply enough, with its 
Sullivan announcement that defamation actions by public officials 
would henceforth be subject to constitutional oversight.  Just three 
years later, the Court expanded the category of plaintiffs subject to 
constitutional oversight to include public figures.159  Four years later, 
it expanded the category of plaintiffs subject to constitutional re-
quirements once more to include all those suing about speech on 
matters of public concern regardless of whether they personally were 
categorized as public figures.160  But three years after that sweeping 
rule was announced, the Court backtracked.161  It concluded that 
 
ing.  Writing as the Court completed its first phase of constitutionalizing defamation in 
Gertz, Henry Monaghan asked, “Can the Court . . . create a sub-order of ‘quasi-
constitutional’ law—of a remedial, substantive, and procedural character—to vindicate 
constitutional liberties?”  Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword:  
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1975).  He suggested that once the 
Court has explicated general values, the burden shifts to the states to develop rules that 
realize those values; the Court can invalidate those rules on a case-by-case basis if the rules 
fall short of the constitutional goal, but the Court cannot “insist upon adherence to con-
stitutionally inspired, but not compelled, rules without considering as decisive whether 
the state has provided minimally satisfactory alternatives . . . .”  Id.  Notably, Justice Byron 
White has been described as losing faith in Sullivan in large part because it spawned a 
“federal common law of defamation” that inserted the Court into the business of regulat-
ing speech.  John C. P. Goldberg, Judging Reputation:  Realism and Common Law in Justice 
White’s Defamation Jurisprudence, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (2003). 
159 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 160–61 (1967) (opinion of Harlan, J.) 
160 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971). 
161 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). 
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stretching the public law treatment of dignitary injuries to speech on 
all matters of public concern would leave many plaintiffs unable to 
vindicate their interests.162  Therefore, in Gertz v. Welch, the Court set-
tled on a rule requiring only public plaintiffs to show actual malice.163 
Although it appeared to finalize the categorization of plaintiffs in 
Gertz, the Court destabilized the scheme ten years later, in Dun & 
Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.164  There, the Court was asked 
whether the heightened scienter requirement of Gertz and Sullivan 
applied to matters of purely private concern.  The Court answered 
the question in the negative.  The holding created a firm safe harbor 
from constitutional speech protection for matters of private concern.  
But this formulation left available by implication the possibility that 
in all matters of public concern, even involving only private figures, 
the heightened intent requirements applied.165  For instance, in 
Snyder v. Phelps, the Court overturned an IIED verdict in large part 
because the defendant’s speech was deemed to be on a matter of 
public concern, even though the plaintiff was a private figure.166 
The Court’s constitutional scheme has also been ambiguous on 
the question of whether to apply different scienter requirements 
based on the identity of the defendant.  For instance, in drafting its 
opinion Dun & Bradstreet, the Court debated but did not resolve 
whether the heightened culpability requirements for defamation re-
covery should be reserved for cases brought only against media de-
fendants.167  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor raised the possibility of a 
 
162 Id. (“The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would 
abridge this legitimate state interest to a degree that we find unacceptable.”) 
163 Id. at 334, 344–47, 352  (“We are persuaded that the trial court did not err in refusing to 
characterize petitioner as a public figure for the purpose of this litigation.  We therefore 
conclude that the New York Times standard is inapplicable to this case . . .  .”). 
164 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (“In light of 
the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we 
hold that the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damag-
es—even absent a showing of ‘actual malice.’”). 
165 See, e.g., Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, The Landmark That Wasn’t:  A First Amendment 
Play in Five Acts, 88 WASH. L. REV.  1, 74 (2013) (noting that Rehnquist realized that he 
was drawing a distinction between matters of private concern and other matters—a dis-
tinction the Court rejected in Gertz, which focused on public verse private figures). 
166 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (“Given that Westboro’s speech was at a 
public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special protection’ 
under the First Amendment. . . . [T]he jury verdict imposing tort liability on Westboro 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be set aside.”). 
167 See e.g., Levine & Wermiel, supra note 165, at 48–52 (describing the debate in Dun over 
whether the Sullivan scheme had been or should be reserved for media defendants only 
in order to allow significant speech to flourish while permitting plaintiff recovery for 
harmful, but presumably less democratically important, non-media speech). 
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media/non-media distinction again in Philadelphia Newspapers v. 
Hepps, again without providing a clear resolution of the question.168 
The Court’s prudential state action analysis typically restricts the 
Justices to adjudication rather than lawmaking.  Disregarding that 
prudential practice in the line of cases from Sullivan and Snyder, the 
Court has attempted to establish a categorical, quasi-legislative 
scheme of dignitary tort.  The result demonstrates that the Court is 
not well-suited to legislative pronouncements.  Devising this scheme 
via common-law decisionmaking techniques has meant that rules 
emerge by half-measure and change with the Court’s composition, 
leaving both speakers and subjects of speech uncertain how to nego-
tiate the inevitable clashes between their interests. 
2.  Imprecision 
Aside from vacillating about which plaintiffs’ cases should be di-
verted for heightened constitutional scrutiny, the Court has also 
failed to clearly denominate how plaintiffs are divided among the 
public and private categories.  Over time, the Court has identified 
five distinct categories of plaintiffs, but it has left the boundaries be-
tween these categories vague and manipulable.  Because this catego-
rization is essential to determining whether the plaintiff’s cause of ac-
tion will be subject to enhanced constitutional oversight, imprecise 
boundaries send mixed signals about the reach of constitutional 
principles into the tort realm. 
The Court in Gertz outlined five distinct categories of dignitary 
tort plaintiff:  the public official, the all-purpose public figure, the 
limited-purpose public figure, the involuntary public figure, and the 
private figure.169  At the same time, it rejected the notion that private 
figure defamation lawsuits could be subjected to enhanced constitu-
tional scrutiny if the relevant speech covered a matter of public con-
 
168 Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1986) (“We also have no occa-
sion to consider the quantity of proof of falsity that a private-figure plaintiff must present 
to recover damages.  Nor need we consider what standards would apply if the plaintiff 
sues a nonmedia defendant . . . .”).  This ambiguity continues to plague defamation law, 
particularly as hybrid speakers such as bloggers proliferate.  If the heightened require-
ments apply only to press defendants, then courts hearing defamation cases must decide 
whether blogger-defendants fit within that category or should be sent to the more tort-
friendly non-media category.  See, e.g., Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 
1292 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Because Cox’s blog post addressed a matter of public concern, 
even assuming that Gertz is limited to such speech, the district court should have instruct-
ed the jury that it could not find Cox liable for defamation unless it found that she acted 
negligently.”). 
169 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). 
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cern.  The Court has over time attempted to define the contours of 
each category.  Public officials “at the very least . . . [are] those 
among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear 
to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the 
conduct of governmental affairs.”170  All-purpose public figures are 
those who “occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence 
that they are deemed public figures for all purposes.”171  These cate-
gories are fairly easy to apply and there has been little controversy 
about their application.  However, the remaining three categories are 
a quagmire.  The Court has defined limited purpose public figures as 
those who “have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular pub-
lic controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues in-
volved”172 and has stated that involuntary public figures are those who 
become public “through no purposeful action of [their] own,” but 
will be “exceedingly rare.”173  All public figures, whether all-purpose 
or involuntary, are required to conduct their tort suits under en-
hanced constitutional scrutiny.  Private figures are those who have 
“not accepted public office or assumed an ‘influential role in order-
ing society.’”174 
The definition of “involuntary” public figures175 suggests that the 
plaintiff’s proximity to a person or issue that is public—even if re-
mote, tangential, or unwilling—may render that person a public fig-
ure.  This definition in effect opens a back door through which 
speaker-defendants can rely on the public interest in their speech 
about private figures to seek constitutional protection, even though 
the Court explicitly disavowed the “public concern” test for the 
constitutionalization of dignitary tort in Gertz.176  In fact, it took three 
cases on the heels of Gertz to illustrate the narrowness of the “limited” 
 
170 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). 
171 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. (quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concur-
ring in result)). 
175 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. 
176 See, e.g., Gerard Magliocca, Involuntary Public Figures, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Nov. 13, 
2013), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/11/involuntary-public-figures.
html (noting that although the Supreme Court in Gertz predicted that “‘truly involuntary 
public figures must be exceedingly rare[,]’ . . . [t]his statement is highly questionable.  
There are lots of involuntary public figures today.  Children of celebrities.  Folks who are 
exposed to scrutiny on social media.  And so on.  Yet the Court used this premise (few in-
voluntary public figures) to support the point that involuntary public figures should be 
treated like voluntary public figures (government officials or celebrities).  Things are too 
well settled, I suppose, to challenge this rule, but its foundation seems weaker.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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and “involuntary” public figure categories.  It found in quick succes-
sion that the wife of the Firestone Tire heir,177 a man with ties to Sovi-
et spies,178 and a scientist who had accepted public funds and been 
ridiculed by a U.S. Senator179 were all private figures. 
Despite these examples, lower courts applying the Court’s defini-
tions in recent years have given a far more capacious meaning to the 
“public” categories, categorizing as “public” plaintiffs nearly indistin-
guishable from the wife, criminal suspect, and scientist found private 
by the Court in the 1970s.180  This tendency may be attributed to the 
difficulty in segregating public and private plaintiffs.  Courts wishing 
to avoid reversal on constitutional grounds will default to a “public” 
categorization, meaning that the path of least resistance is to subject 
plaintiffs bringing dignitary tort claims with any public dimension to 
the constitutional tort requirements. Functionally, the “public con-
cern” category rejected in Gertz has been subsumed into the “limited 
purpose” and “involuntary” public figure categories, in large part be-
cause the Court’s categories were imprecise.181 
By defining state action very broadly in Sullivan, the Court invited 
itself to legislate a speech-friendly dignitary tort scheme.  This scheme 
established ex ante categories of dignitary tort cases that were to be 
diverted for constitutional protection. Unsurprisingly, this scheme 
was riddled with inconsistencies and imprecision.  As discussed below, 
 
177 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455 (1976) (“We hold respondent was not a ‘public 
figure’ for the purpose of determining the constitutional protection afforded petitioner’s 
report of the factual and legal basis of her divorce.”). 
178 Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979). 
179 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 136 (1979) (“Finally, we cannot agree that 
Hutchinson had such access to the media that he should be classified as a public figure.  
Hutchinson’s access was limited to responding to the announcement of the Golden 
Fleece Award.”). 
180 See, e.g., Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 532 F.3d 312, 315 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding anthrax spe-
cialist limited purpose public figure for purposes of media coverage on the search for the 
perpetrator of anthrax mailings to federal officeholders); Zupnik v. Assoc. Press, 31 F. 
Supp. 2d 70, 72 (D. Conn. 1998) (finding wife of a doctor who received a citation for 
medical incompetence a public figure “by virtue of her marriage to [the doctor]”); Atlan-
ta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 184 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (finding a secu-
rity guard a “media hero” public figure because he granted many interviews and photo 
shoots). 
181 Distinguishing matters of “public concern” from those of “private concern” is no easier 
than labeling plaintiffs “public” or “private.”  The Court has acknowledged recently that 
although protection for speech on matters of “public concern” grows, “‘the boundaries of 
the public concern test are not well defined.’”  Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 
(2011) (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam)).  See also 
Mark Strasser, What’s It To You:  The First Amendment and Matters of Public Concern, 77 MO. 
L. REV. 1083 (2012) (describing the development of the “matters of public concern” doc-
trine and arguing that the Court’s inconsistent jurisprudence must be clarified). 
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the horizontal overreach resulting from the state action analysis in 
Sullivan has diminished dignitary tort without noticeably enhancing 
democratically relevant speech. 
V.  THE SUPPRESSION OF SUBSIDIARY COMMUNITIES 
In addition to using Sullivan’s imprudent state action approach to 
encroach horizontally on the legislative function, the Court used it to 
overreach vertically and suppress subfederal units of political and so-
cial organization.  Specifically, the Court has disempowered states by 
imposing uniform federal tort rules and has disempowered local 
communities by confining jury authority to decide questions of fact 
with reference to local norms.  Throughout this line of cases, the 
Court indicated repeatedly that its speech-friendly 
constitutionalization of dignitary tort was motivated by a fear of cul-
tural norms developed by subsidiary communities and at the state 
level.  While providing constitutional laws of substance and proce-
dure for these torts, the Justices repeatedly expressed skepticism 
about the parochialism and emotionality of juries and of subsidiary 
communities generally.  Notably, throughout these cases, the com-
munity-suppressing agenda has rarely commanded a majority of the 
Court.  As discussed below, each time the Court has rendered a deci-
sion privileging the national community, a number of Justices have 
inevitably complained that the values of state autonomy and commu-
nity responsiveness were being lost. 
The decision in Sullivan to devise a constitutional dignitary tort 
rule and to invalidate any inconsistent state tort schemes was a direct 
suppression of state authority to develop its own private law.  Histori-
cally, state defamation doctrines recognized some flexibility to allow 
for free discussion of public affairs, but each state struck the speech-
reputation balance according to its own lights.  For instance, pre-
Sullivan, Massachusetts common law provided that speakers were 
immune from libel judgments when they engaged in comment and 
criticism about officeholders, but not when their speech involved 
false statements of fact.182  In contrast, Oklahoma common law pro-
vided that speakers were privileged when engaging in fair comment 
and criticism and when discussing matters of public interest so long as 
they did so without malice and honestly believed their words to be 
true, except that statements imputing criminal behavior were not cov-
ered by privilege; further, public officials had the burden of proving 
 
182 LAWHORNE, supra note 89, at 135. 
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the problematic statement false.183  Before dignitary tort was constitu-
tionalized, the right to set a locally appropriate speech-dignity bal-
ance was considered a state prerogative.  In fact, state treatment of 
this issue tended to reflect some geographic preferences, with West-
ern states and several states on the East Coast carving out more room 
for speech about public officials, and states in the Midwest and South 
following more reputation-friendly rules.184 
Sullivan’s “actual malice” categorical scheme replaced these flexi-
ble measures with a blunt tool dictating how juries were to distinguish 
between injury and message, with knowledge or recklessness acting as 
a proxy—and an unprecedentedly speech-protective proxy—for in-
tent to injure.185  This voiding of the fifty individual state schemes and 
replacement with a uniform federal scheme short-circuited the more 
typical dialogue between state and federal government, in which the 
Court articulates a principle and states are given leeway to develop 
their own rules that conform to the principle.  For instance, in the 
punitive damages context, the Court has evolved over time from ar-
ticulating general principles towards offering increasingly specific 
proscriptions.  It has not, however, in the course of the cases, wiped 
out state law on punitive damages in favor of a single federal rule that 
sets forth the only due process-compliant way to assess punitive dam-
ages.186 
Further, in developing the details of the categorical scheme, the 
Court declined to delegate to the states any authority.  For instance, 
in Rosenblatt v. Baer, the Court considered how to decide who is a 
public official for purposes of determining when the Sullivan actual 
malice rule applies.187  It refused to adopt a rule incorporating defini-
tions of “public official” promulgated at the state level.  The Court 
said that definitions devised for “local administrative purposes” were 
not sufficient to determine the scope of “national constitutional pro-
tection.”188  Concurring separately, Justice Potter Stewart urged more 
 
183 Id. at 148–49. 
184 Id. at 210. 
185 Id. at 280. 
186 Justice White pointed out in Gertz that external constitutional limits on damage awards 
deprived the states of “the opportunity to experiment with different methods for guard-
ing against abuses.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 397 (1974) (White, J., dis-
senting). He added that “our constitutional scheme compels a proper respect for the role 
of the [s]tates in acquitting their duty to obey the Constitution” and absent a finding that 
the states were shirking that duty, the Court had no warrant to impose per se rules on the 
states.  Id. at 404. 
187 383 U.S. 75, 77 (1966). 
188 Id. at 84. 
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respect for the state role in administering the defamation tort, not-
ing, “The protection of private personality, like the protection of life 
itself, is left primarily to the individual [s]tates under the Ninth and 
Tenth Amendments.”189  Justice Abe Fortas agreed, describing the 
Supreme Court’s imposition of a federal “public official” definition as 
a “Procrustean bed for state law.”190 
The Court’s suppression of subfederal organizational units in the 
dignitary tort context was not limited to state sovereign units.  Many 
of the Court’s decisions appear designed to suppress cultural norms 
that are developed at the more subsidiary level of local social com-
munity, often by disallowing jury instructions or overturning jury 
factfinding.  For example, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.191 the 
Court explained that the “reasonable-man” rule used in most tort 
cases to represent standards in the relevant locality were “inconsistent 
with our national commitment under the First Amendment.”192  Jus-
tice John Marshall Harlan II complained that overriding state auton-
omy to set the standard distorted state-federal relations.193 
In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,194 the Court disallowed an instruction 
that let the jury find for the plaintiff without proof of Sullivan malice 
for statements that dealt with the private area of a political candi-
date’s life because the instruction “left the jury far more leeway to act 
as censors” than allowed by the First Amendment.195  In Rosenbloom, 
the Court held that letting private citizens recover damages based on 
a “jury determination that a publisher probably failed to use reasona-
ble care” was too speech-prohibitive because publishers would have to 
“guess[] how a jury might assess” the pre-publication steps they took 
to ensure accuracy.196  Justice Thurgood Marshall added that allowing 
private citizens unlimited access to punitive damages in defamation 
cases “allows juries to penalize heavily the unorthodox and the un-
 
189 Id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).  See also Cristina Carmody Tilley, Rescuing Dignitary Torts 
from the Constitution, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 65 (2012) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment 
provides a rule of construction that requires interpreting the First Amendment to avoid 
gratuitous impairment of rights that are unenumerated, but nevertheless retained, in-
cluding rights to seek compensation via tort for infringements of individual dignity). 
190 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 101 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
191 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
192 Id. at 49–51.  Note that the holding of Rosenbloom was later disavowed in Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). 
193 Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 62–63 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
194 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971). 
195 Id. at 275. 
196 Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 50. 
Apr. 2015] ALCHEMY OF STATE ACTION 1163 
 
popular [speech] and exact little [punishment] from other[, more 
uncontroversial, speakers].”197 
Later, in Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association. v. Bresler, the 
Court again suppressed subsidiary community values when it over-
turned a jury finding that a newspaper article saying a local property 
owner was trying to “blackmail” the city in a land deal was a defama-
tory imputation of criminal behavior. 198  The Court held that no rea-
sonable reader would have understood the word that way, despite the 
fact that each member of the jury had done just that.199  Concurring, 
Justice Byron White wondered how the Court had “superior insight 
with respect to how the word ‘blackmail’ would be understood by the 
ordinary reader in Greenbelt, Maryland.”200 
In sum, the Sullivan line of cases reveals a steady vertical over-
reaching by the Court, replacing state tort law rules with uniform 
federal rules and reaching beyond state polities into subsidiary com-
munities represented by juries to invalidate jury instructions that give 
them leeway to apply local norms and to reverse their findings of fact.  
If in Sullivan the Court had defined state action prudentially, to in-
clude just the verdict, it would have been restricted to overturning 
the verdict and warning state courts and juries against imposing local 
norms on national speech in the future.  That path would have rele-
gated the Court to a mere supervisory role while state courts and ju-
ries confronted the increasingly common local-versus-national fact 
pattern on an incremental basis.  Instead it transformed the dignitary 
torts into a subcategory of constitutional law and supplied a set of 
 
197 Id. at 84 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
198 Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 7–10 (1970). 
199 Id. at 8, 14. 
200 Id. at 22 (White, J., concurring).  This distrust of juries extended into the IIED sphere as 
well.  The Court in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell held that the “outrageousness” stand-
ard for the IIED tort was so subjective that jurors could “impose liability on the basis of 
[their] tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression,” 
thus justifying application of the actual malice guard rails to IIED suits brought by public 
figures. 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).  Similarly, in Snyder v. Phelps, the Court predicted that in 
cases involving polarizing social issues, “a jury is ‘unlikely to be neutral with respect to the 
content of [the] speech . . . .’” Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (alteration 
in original) (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510 
(1984)).  The risk of jury bias was not permissible, it reasoned, because “insulting, and 
even outrageous” speech must be “tolerate[d]” to provide sufficient First Amendment 
“breathing space” for speech.  Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  This possibility justified overturning the jury verdict without applying the actual 
malice test to try to distill out intent to injure from intent to circulate a message.  Id. (It 
has been pointed out elsewhere that an intent test turning on falsehood is not well-suited 
for IIED, which is an action for behavior that is outrageous whether it involves true or 
false statements.) 
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rules, flattening subsidiary community norms and indirectly delegiti-
mizing subsidiary community as a legally relevant unit of social organ-
ization.201  This scheme was celebrated in the short-term as a vindica-
tion of liberal democratic values that protected nationally significant 
speech while preserving some tort recourse for the most injurious or 
insignificant speech.  But the early promise of Sullivan has withered.  
This failure can be traced back to the horizontal and vertical over-
reaching that stemmed from the Court’s imprudent state action anal-
ysis in the case. 
VI.  THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF SULLIVAN 
The Court’s categorical public law/private law tort scheme held 
great early promise—Alexander Meiklejohn famously declared Sulli-
van “an occasion for dancing in the streets.”202  But the Sullivan 
scheme has inadvertently weakened tort without galvanizing the kind 
of civically useful speech the Court seemed to anticipate. 
First, speech the Court originally intended to divert for private law 
treatment has steadily been shifted into the public category because 
online speech is making the public-private divide obsolete.  As a re-
sult, plaintiffs injured by democratically insignificant speech are func-
tionally less protected than the Court intended when it overreached 
horizontally into the legislative function to devise its constitutional 
matrix for these causes of action.  Second, because the vertical impo-
sition of national values has reduced local courts’ and juries’ auton-
omy to respond to social media injuries such as revenge porn or mug 
shot extortion sites, the Court has drastically changed the concept of 
tort “duty” that individuals are understood to owe to others.  The cat-
egorical scheme, and its ever-wider application, signals that behavior 
thought for centuries to be unacceptable is, in fact, unremarkable.  
Finally, it is not at all clear that the shrinking of tort has been paired 
with an expansion of the news coverage the Court intended to incen-
tivize.  Hard news and investigative journalism has dramatically de-
clined in the half-century since Sullivan. 
 
201 In other areas of the law, doctrine has accommodated community-privileging principles 
and liberal democratic principles simultaneously.  See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism, 
Community, and State Borders, 41 DUKE L.J. 1, 26 (1991) (noting that general jurisdiction 
“reflects assumptions about the importance of community membership” while specific ju-
risdiction reflects liberal democratic assumptions that authority for state intervention is 
derived from the harm principle). 
202 Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case:  A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (1964). 
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A. The Court’s Constitutional Legislation has Grown Obsolete 
State common-law lawmaking, particularly in the tort context, is 
marked by flexibility and incremental evolution over time in response 
to changed circumstances and changing community mores.203  Histor-
ically, a robust private law of tort has provided an efficient ex post re-
sponsive signal about the proper use of innovations that are too new 
or too difficult to treat ex ante via statute (such as automobiles204 or 
toxic torts205).  The Court’s horizontal overreaching to legislate a cat-
egorical scheme for defamation, privacy, and IIED has prevented tort 
from bringing its unique jurisprudential benefits to bear in the age of 
electronic speech and social media.  By imposing fixed federalized 
categories to assign value to speech and dignity, the Court has 
thwarted the common law’s ability to adapt to changed circumstanc-
es. 
At the same time, electronic speech and social media have dis-
rupted the traditional speech configurations that were the basis of 
the Court’s “public,” “private,” “knowing,” and “negligent” categories.  
Speech transmitted over Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram and 
on websites and blogs is performative.  It is transmitted by or about 
public officials, institutional celebrities, and obscure individuals, and 
then forwarded, followed, retweeted, liked, and shared among these 
same constituencies.206  These platforms render the public private and 
 
203 Jay Tidmarsh, A Process Theory of Torts, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1313, 1331 (1994) (describ-
ing tort as “being in perpetual process”). 
204 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (abolishing the re-
quirement of privity as a basis for product liability causes of action); see, e.g., Sally H. 
Clarke, Unmanageable Risks:  MacPherson v. Buick and the Emergence of a Mass Consumer 
Market, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 4–5 (2005) (noting that MacPherson was a response to the 
emerging mass market in which automakers were selling vehicles before perfecting their 
technology in order to capitalize on growing demand). 
205 See, e.g., Rustad, supra note 131, at 475. 
206 See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 919 
(2005).  Strahilevitz questions the soundness of a normative approach to determining 
whether information is private, because “individuals and communities will disagree sub-
stantially about what information is more private and what is more public” and because 
deputizing judges to make that normative assessment poses a “real danger that the stand-
ards of propriety that they introduce into the law will clash with attitudes that reflect 
changing cultural beliefs and varied preferences among the citizenry[,]” especially in re-
sponse to “changes in technologies or social norms.”  Id. at 931 & n.30.  He urges instead 
an empirical approach to distinguishing between the public and the private using social 
network theory to reach an objective conclusion about what extent of information shar-
ing can be expected to follow particular disclosures.  Id. at 919, 921.  The scope of sharing 
within one’s network can be considered “private” whereas sharing beyond that scope is 
considered “public.”  It is not necessary to weigh in on the relative benefits of a normative 
or empirical approach to distinguishing between public and private to appreciate that 
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the private public, dissolving the boundary lines that are the heart of 
the Court’s categorical scheme. 
Several examples illustrate the obsolescence of these “public” and 
“private” categories.  In 2011, a class of Facebook users sued the so-
cial media service over its “Sponsored Story” program.207  Prior to set-
tlement of the suit and discontinuation of the program,208 Facebook 
had used participant actions such as “liking” a product or event to 
generate faux news stories about the user’s endorsement of the 
product or event.209  The stories were actually considered advertising 
and were paid for by the entity that sold the product or sponsored 
the event, to be shared with any of the user’s friends who were able to 
see the original “Like” or “Check In.”210  Defending against the class 
suit for misappropriation of their names and likenesses, Facebook in-
voked the constitutional protection for matters of “legitimate public 
interest,” arguing that the relevant “public” in the Facebook configu-
ration would be “the audience with whom the User chose to share the 
content in the first place[,]” meaning that the Sponsored Story is a 
matter of public interest and thus sufficiently newsworthy to fall with-
in an exception to the relevant California misappropriation statute.211 
The distortion of the “public interest” category is further illustrat-
ed by Stayart v. Google, Inc., brought by Wisconsin woman Beverly 
Stayart after finding that her name had inexplicably become linked 
with erectile dysfunction products in the Yahoo and Google search 
engines.212 Stayart’s initial suit against Yahoo for violations of the 
Lanham Act was dismissed because the court found she had no 
commercial interest in her name.213  She subsequently sued Google 
for misappropriation and was again denied relief, this time because 
her initial suit against Yahoo meant that her association with ED 
drugs was now considered a matter of “public interest[,] primarily 
because [she] has made it one” by suing first Yahoo and then 
Google.214  In the context of electronic speech, it is plausible to argue 
 
identifying the boundary between the two is a task complicated by the continued growth 
of social media networks. 
207 See Facebook Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, Fra-
ley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 11-CV-01726 LHK). 
208 Somini Sengupta, To Settle Lawsuit, Facebook Alters Policy for Its Like Button, N.Y. TIMES, June 
22, 2012, at B2. 
209 See Facebook Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Class Action Complaint, supra 
note 207. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 21. 
212 710 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 2013). 
213 Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc., 623 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 2010). 
214 Stayart v. Google, 710 F.3d at 723. 
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today that these plaintiffs are involved in matters of public concern 
simply by virtue of speaking online, and thus given reduced entitle-
ment to reputation, privacy, or emotional well-being.215 
Notably, in both Fraley and Stayart the objectionable electronic 
content was generated not by any individual at Facebook, Yahoo, or 
Google, but by algorithms.  The increasing use of algorithms to gen-
erate content on these platforms makes the task of sifting “knowing 
or reckless” language choices from merely “negligent” language 
choices complex if not impossible.  Increasingly, media and social 
media actors use automation and coding to pull bits of information 
to generate so-called “click bait.”216  This reality calls into further 
question the current viability of the constitutional common law 
scheme, whereby First Amendment protection for allegedly tortious 
speech fluctuates with the scienter of the speaker.  Knowing or reck-
less circulation of falsehoods (or privacy-invading or outrageous 
speech) is less protected while merely negligent circulation of prob-
lematic speech is more protected.  Commentators have recently be-
gun to consider whether algorithms should be considered speech, 
state regulation of which would be covered by the First Amend-
ment.217  They have not yet turned to the more complex question of 
how to determine the level of culpability represented by companies 
devising programs to generate automated content or by individual 
coders executing corporate content objectives.  At any rate, the in-
creasing use of algorithms to produce content is outpacing the 
Court’s constitutional categories. 
The Court could not have foreseen that the revolution in speech 
technology would uncouple its proxy categories from the underlying 
legal values they were designed to represent.  Nevertheless, technolo-
gy has evolved so that the public and private figure categories no 
 
215 See, e.g., Hibdon v. Grabowski, 195 S.W.3d 48, 60–63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that 
a jet ski hobbyist who posted to an internet news group about his jet ski customizing busi-
ness, and who was later mentioned in jet ski magazines, was a public figure because his 
posts to the website were a voluntary entry into public controversy). 
216 See, e.g., Alex Halperin, This Man Decides What You Read, SALON (Oct. 27, 2013, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/2013/10/27/this_man_decide_what_you_read (describing the 
media practice of generating provocative “click-bait headlines . . . unnecessary 
slideshows . . . [and] other chicanery to inflate page views” and entice advertisers, based 
on data from engagement services that track how specific words drive clicks and extend 
the time spent on page views). 
217 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1447 (2013) 
(“Instead, I will look to broadly accepted sources and forms of legal reasoning—which in 
the First Amendment context means primarily Supreme Court jurisprudence—and con-
sider whether those sources lead to the conclusion that algorithm-based outputs are 
speech for First Amendment purposes.”). 
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longer synchronize with the democratic relevance of speech.  As a re-
sult, democratically irrelevant (and injurious) speech must increas-
ingly be sifted into the “public” category,218 where “dice are loaded” 
against plaintiffs.219 
B. The Court’s Suppression of Subsidiary Community Values has Changed 
the Notion of “Duty” in Dignitary Tort 
One writer has said that “‘defamation law’s symbolic function is 
even more vital than its instrumental one’ because it is a ‘deliberate 
public expression and affirmation of social codes and values.’”220  
 
218 In this respect, the Sullivan line of cases is an example of what has been described as “in-
terest creep,” a phenomenon in which courts’ previous acceptance of a category of gov-
ernment interests leads to the invocation of that interest in an increasingly vague and un-
documented fashion to justify particular outcomes without diligent judicial review. Dov 
Fox, Interest Creep, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 273–276 (2014).  Interest creep has been 
used to describe the incremental expansion of state interests such as national security or 
the protection of potential life that are proffered to justify legislation and the inverse con-
traction of judicial scrutiny when these state interests are invoked.  In the context of dig-
nitary injuries, however, the interest creep appears to have proceeded in the opposite di-
rection, with courts invoking free speech interests in an increasingly sweeping fashion in 
order to avoid giving weight to the state interest in injury compensation for dignitary 
torts.  For instance, in Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., 955 P.2d 469, 488 (Cal. 1998), the Cali-
fornia court held that airing secret camera footage of a woman talking to emergency re-
sponders during her rescue from a car accident was not actionable as a public disclosure 
of private facts tort because the footage was relevant to the public issue of highway safety.  
Contrast this result with the Court’s grudging recognition of a constitutional protection 
for a news report of a deceased rape victim’s name, which the Court said was required on-
ly because it was provided to the reporter by a court official during the course of a crimi-
nal trial against the perpetrator, but that otherwise would not have qualified as a matter 
of public concern.  Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495–97 (1975). 
219 Lidsky, supra note 140, at 46.  The plaintiff’s challenges (and the likelihood of speech-
privileging interest creep) are amplified by the unique procedural posture of tort cases.  
Private individuals, rather than the state, are the real parties in interest in these cases.  So 
unlike constitutional challenges to legislative burdens on speech, where the state is a liti-
gant, in judicial review of tort results burdening speech, the state is not on hand to de-
fend its common-law tort principles.  The plaintiff is not well-positioned to defend the 
state’s interest in a dignitary tort scheme, or in the specifics of that scheme.  This ill fit is 
exacerbated by the common-law nature of tort, where state “law” has not been reduced to 
a single definitive text (like a statute) but is instead diffused over a series of court opin-
ions addressing variable fact patterns.  Further, these “laws” typically feature open-
textured terms interpreted by juries that have left behind no record of the rationales for 
their verdicts.  See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 117, at 767–771; id. at 770 (“The point is on-
ly that a court’s role is unusually complex when it is both the sole state actor and the deci-
sion-maker that is asked to decide whether the state action violates the First Amend-
ment.”).  This is one reason the traditional strict scrutiny/compelling interest regime for 
reviewing speech laws has not been squarely applied to speech torts. 
220 Haven Ward, “I’m Not Gay, M’Kay?”:  Should Falsely Calling Someone a Homosexual Be Defama-
tory?, 44 GA. L. REV. 739, 766 (2010) (quoting John C. Watson, Defamation by Racial Misi-
dentification:  A Study of the Social Tort, 4 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 77, 78 (2002)); Joseph R. 
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Consequently, providing private law recourse for the kind of “moral 
injuries” effected by dignitary torts reasserts subsidiary community 
behavioral norms.  Conversely, formal legal rules limiting that re-
course also shape norms, but in the other direction.  The transfor-
mation of private dignitary torts tilted towards plaintiffs into public 
law causes of action tilted against plaintiffs has signaled, in effect, that 
speakers no longer owe a duty of care to the subjects of their speech.  
Ironically the informal, low-cost signal provided by dignitary tort law 
waned just as a new type of community—the virtual community—
began to populate the internet.  The absence of an ex post private 
law mechanism to allow for the development of values within these 
online communities has led to a widespread view that no holds are 
barred when it comes to internet speech.221 
Defamation, IIED, and privacy torts carry messages quite apart 
from the actual speech articulated by the tortfeasor; “[t]hey are ways 
a wrongdoer has of saying to us, ‘I count but you do not,’ ‘I can use 
you for my purposes,’ or ‘I am here up high and you are there down 
below.’”222  The failure to correct that message and reassert relational 
equality between tortfeasor-speaker and plaintiff-victim “says, in ef-
fect, that [the victim] can be treated in this way, and that such treat-
ment is acceptable.”223 
The Sullivan line of cases says that as a matter of constitutional 
law, dignitary tort victims who cannot prove themselves purely private 
figures may be treated this way, and that such treatment is acceptable.  
Pre-Sullivan norms that falsehoods about private individuals could be 
treated as per se injurious or a basis for punitive damages,224 that 
 
Gusfield, On Legislating Morals:  The Symbolic Process of Designating Deviance, 56 CAL. L. REV. 
54, 57 (1968) (“A governmental agent’s act may have symbolic import because it affects 
the designation of public norms.  The courtroom decision or the legislative act often glo-
rifies the values of one group and demeans those of another.”). 
221 See, e.g., Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (describing an 
anonymous blogger who in light of a would-be defamation claim argued that the plaintiff 
would likely fail as a matter of law because “Internet blogs serve as a modern day forum 
for conveying personal opinions, including invective and ranting, [so that online state-
ments] . . . when considered in that context, cannot be reasonably understood as factual 
assertions”). 
222 Scott Hershovitz, Tort as a Substitute for Revenge, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
LAW OF TORTS 86, 93 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014) (quoting Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness 
and Resentment, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 25 
(1988) (explaining the messages implicit in moral injury)). 
223 Hershovitz, supra note 222, at 94 (quoting Pamela Hieronymi, Articulating an Uncompro-
mising Forgiveness, LXII PHIL. AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 529, 530 (2001)). 
224 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 310, 311 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (“Because plaintiff’s 
complaint sufficiently avers a libel per se, actual and punitive damages may be recovered 
without pleading special damages.”). 
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speech even on matters of public concern could not be expressed so 
outrageously that severe emotional consequences were certain to fol-
low,225 and that fictionalized accounts of a person’s private life were 
compensable,226 have been muffled considerably by the imposition of 
constitutional rules that prevent juries from awarding damages for in-
juries that result when the norms are ignored. 
The importation of these speech-privileging norms on electronic 
platforms has had a demonstrably corrosive effect in a number of set-
tings.  For instance, cyberbullying that is difficult to treat in tort—
cybercitizens are now arguably “public” for legal purposes—has led to 
a well-publicized number of the teen and tween suicides.227  The blasé 
attitude of some digital natives about the duty to exercise care when 
using these platforms was demonstrated in the aftermath of a 2013 
tween cyberbullying suicide in Florida.228  A fourteen-year-old girl 
admitted that she had been one of the instigators bullying a twelve-
year-old who eventually killed herself.  After the suicide, the instigator 
posted on Facebook that “Yes, [I know] I bullied Rebecca and she 
killed herself [but] IDGAF [I don’t give a f***] . . . .”229  Similarly, re-
venge porn magnate Hunter Moore responded to criticisms of his 
sites in an interview by asking, “Why should I care?  It’s not my life.”230  
To the extent that tort indicates to the community what behavior is 
undesirable, disabling the dignitary torts indicates to the community 
that careless, injury-inflicting speech is no longer undesirable.  The 
weakening of the tort-signaling mechanism has arguably contributed 
to the failure of virtual communities to develop strong norms against 
injurious speech. 
 
225 Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1276 (4th Cir. 1986) (“We need not consider whether the 
statements in question constituted opinion, as the issue is whether their publication was 
sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.”). 
226 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384 (1967) (“[T]he statute gives him a right of action 
when his name, picture, or portrait is the subject of a ‘fictitious’ report or article.”). 
227 Hershovitz, supra note 222, at 94 (quoting Hieronymi, supra note 223, at 546);  see, e.g., 
Lizette Alvarez, Felony Counts for 2 in Suicide of Bullied 12-Year-Old, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 
2013, at A20. 




230 Carol Kuruvilla, Revenge Porn Curators Defend Their X-Rated Websites, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 
8, 2013, 3:53 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/minds-revenge-porn-
curators-aricle-1.1259114. 
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C. The Failure of Sullivan to Incentivize a Vigorous Press 
Finally, it is far from clear that the dignitary costs following from 
the constitutionalization of these torts has been offset by the speech-
enhancing benefits the Court envisioned.  The Sullivan scheme 
emerged just as the business model for news organizations evolved.  
Families that had long run news organizations as private concerns 
began to take their companies public, assuming a fiduciary duty to 
maximize profits for shareholders.  When this change in financial in-
centive structures was coupled with the Court’s provision of a consti-
tutional rule protecting careless reporting about public figures, one 
result was a noticeable shift in institutional emphasis from hard news 
reporting to soft reporting on celebrities and personalities. 
In the early 1960s, just as the Court was remaking defamation law, 
the market was remaking the paradigmatic news organization.  His-
torically, newspapers and local television and radio stations were or-
ganized as closely held corporations, often owned by local families for 
many generations. 231  These news institutions were as concerned with 
civic welfare as they were with news coverage.232  “Beginning in the 
1960’s, in order to generate capital to finance acquisitions, to reduce 
indebtedness, and to fend off hostile takeover attempts, newspaper 
companies went public.  Prominent among these were Dow Jones, 
Gannett, Gray Communication, Lee Enterprises, Media General, New 
York Times, and Times Mirror [and the Washington Post].”233 
This ownership change shifted the organizations’ foremost re-
sponsibility from serving as community institutions to maximizing 
shareholder wealth.  The products that emerged from these business 
models “underproduce[d] news that enhance[d] citizens’ political 
interest, knowledge, and sophistication, in large part because the 
commercial pressure on suppliers is to attract the largest audience 
possible.  The average audience member does not seek complex, so-
phisticated information, and the mass media must target that average 
member.” 234 
 
231 GILBERT CRANBERG ET AL., TAKING STOCK:  JOURNALISM AND THE PUBLICLY TRADED 
NEWSPAPER COMPANY 24–46 (2001). 
232 See, e.g., KATHARINE GRAHAM, PERSONAL HISTORY 185–86 (1997) (recounting an incident 
in which Washington Post publisher Philip Graham convened White House officials in his 
office to hear from a reporter about a race riot that had broken out at a local pool and he 
told the officials the story had been slated for front-page coverage, but offered to kill the 
piece if they would act to quell the violence and integrate the pool). 
233 CRANBERG, supra note 231, at 27. 
234 CRANBERG, supra note 231, at 132; GRAHAM, supra note 232, at 441–42. 
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The evolution in news product following Sullivan is reflected in a 
1999 study comparing the content of leading U.S. daily newspapers in 
1963–64 with their content in 1999.  As a percentage of total 
newshole, sports and features have risen from 39% to 47%, and hard 
news has dropped from 35% to 24%.235 
Further, the constitutional protections that Sullivan introduced 
for low-care reporting have been observed to work primarily in favor 
of low-care news organizations producing “soft” news, rather than as a 
shield for high-care news organizations focusing on envelope-pushing 
“hard” news.  One economist has summarized that 
the principal beneficiaries . . . on balance may be those media enterprises 
that use relatively little care in reporting, succeeding more by virtue of 
their style and capacity to shock, titillate, or intrigue consumers.  At first 
blush, this may seem odd:  these enterprises are likely both to generate a 
substantially greater proportion of false statements and lose a substantial-
ly greater proportion of cases than will high-care defendants under a 
negligence or strict liability test . . . . But the actual malice rule and prec-
edents implementing it should confer a substantial benefit on these me-
dia in aiding their escape from liability.  As the proportion of judgments 
against low-care media enterprises declines, the incidence of suit against 
them should fall correspondingly . . . . Low-care media, thus, probably 
face lower total costs—award costs, non-award costs, and defense costs—
after [Sullivan] and may respond by decreasing care or increasing the 
amount of speech activity.  To the extent that these enterprises’ coverage 
is skewed toward some group of public figures—for instance, entertain-
ers—those individuals are likely to be subject to more, or less accurate, 
critical comment after [Sullivan].236 
In sum, the Court’s ambitious goal in Sullivan and its progeny—to 
incentivize fearless press coverage of democratically relevant issues 
while preserving a legally protected interest in reputation—has not 
come of age as intended.  The Court deployed its alchemic state ac-
tion analysis to produce more of a prized value—speech—while at-
tempting to preserve a tort channel to vindicate individual dignity.  
Instead, the costs to dignity have been steep and the speech payoff 
has been slight.  The Court’s categorical scheme, when applied to an 
electronic speech environment, has funneled into the “public law” 
category a great deal of speech the Court originally meant to retain in 
the “private law” category.  Moreover, the abrupt makeover of digni-
tary tort from a plaintiff-protective cause of action to a defendant-
 
235 Carl Sessions Stepp, State of the American Newspaper:  Then and Now, AM. JOURNALISM REV.,   
Sept. 1999, http://www.ajrarchive.org/article.asp?id=3192. 
236 Ronald A. Cass, Principle and Interest in Libel Law after New York Times:  An Incentive Analy-
sis, in THE COST OF LIBEL:  ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, 101–02 (Everette E. 
Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds., 1989). 
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protective cause of action has signaled to speakers that they no longer 
owe a duty of care to the subjects of their speech.  Meanwhile, the 
constitutional speech subsidy provided by Sullivan has combined with 
the profit-oriented model of newly public media companies to yield 
more low-care reporting on lucrative “soft news” topics and less con-
stitutionally protected reporting on the kind of democratically rele-
vant “hard news” the Court envisioned when crafting its Sullivan 
scheme. 
VII.  MODERNIZING DIGNITARY TORT 
The Court’s imprudent state action analysis in Sullivan set in mo-
tion a dysfunctional law of dignitary tort.  In contrast, the Court’s 
prudential approach to state action may point the way to recalibrat-
ing dignitary tort law without forfeiting the central message of the 
case:  subsidiary communities may not impose their values on the na-
tional community. 
The prudential approach to state action limits the Court’s re-
sponse to unconstitutional private law adjudication; either the Court 
can announce a rule prohibiting the enforcement of certain kinds of 
private law arrangements (as in Shelley)237 or it can remand problemat-
ic cases one-by-one with directions to reapply the private law rules in 
keeping with constitutional values (as in NAACP v. Claiborne Hard-
ware).238  The former approach is not a practical way to constitutional-
ly confine the private law of defamation—unlike contracts which may 
be entered into without court involvement, complaints of defamation 
require judicial adjudication.  However, the latter approach to un-
constitutional private law verdicts is promising.  The promise of Sulli-
van could be redeemed by shifting away from the Court’s categorical 
scheme and instead emphasizing a constitutional rule that externaliz-
ing subsidiary community values onto other communities is a speech 
abridgment.  Failure to prevent verdicts that do externalize subsidiary 
norms would lead to reversal or remand of those verdicts—the relevant 
state actions—but would not occasion a federal judicial imposition on 
local norms. 
Articulating this constitutional principle would allow states to 
adapt their private law rules or procedures to avoid such results.  It 
would simultaneously prevent the Court from dictating the content of 
state law.  Finally, it would relegitimize subsidiary communities as a 
 
237 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
238 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
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legally relevant unit of social organization.  Recognizing that subsidi-
ary communities have the authority to organize their own affairs 
could revive dignitary tort as a low-cost, ex post response to injurious 
speech.  This revival could be especially helpful in addressing online 
behavior such as revenge porn, mugshot extortion, and 
cyberbullying.  Online injuries inflicted within subsidiary virtual 
communities would be met with ex post tort verdicts signaling behav-
ioral norms, which could preempt the need for broad ex ante crimi-
nal legislation requiring expensive and onerous state enforcement. 
A. The Multiplicity of American Communities 
Sociologically, “community” may be marked by either a common 
nucleus of practice or a common geographic circumstance.  Using 
this definition, one can identify at least three distinct types of com-
munities prevalent in the United States today:  subsidiary geographic 
communities, subsidiary virtual communities, and a single national 
geographic community. 
Subsidiary geographic communities, Gemeinschaft communities, 
have traditionally been the legally relevant unit for applying the tort 
standard that determines whether speech is injurious (whether it 
would deter third parties from association in the defamation tort, 
whether it is outrageous in the IIED tort, or whether it is highly of-
fensive to a reasonable person in the public disclosure of private facts 
tort).  For instance, in one well-known example, a jury drawn from a 
Jewish community found defamatory a mistaken listing of a kosher 
butcher shop in an advertisement for bacon purveyors.239 
Virtual communities have the capacity to serve the same norm-
giving role in today’s dignitary tort context.  Like geographic com-
munities, which share common local circumstances, these groups 
share a common nucleus of practice.  Community values for tort pur-
poses have been defined as “the principles or standards of fairness 
and propriety with which the community operates.  These values are 
not necessarily based on any normative theories of justice or morality; 
they are culturally determined through the community’s practices 
and shared beliefs.”240  Participants in online platforms with recog-
nized behavioral norms belong to a community, and typically invest 
time in developing and maintaining norms for communicating on 
 
239 See Braun v. Armour & Co., 254 N.Y. 514 (1930). 
240 Tidmarsh, supra note 203, at 1354. 
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the platform.241  For instance, the speech and interpersonal behavior-
al norms that apply on Grindr, an application used primarily by gay, 
bisexual, and bi-curious men to locate other community members in 
close proximity, would likely be very different than those on Club 
Penguin, a multiplayer online game that involves a virtual world de-
signed for children and tweens.  The groups of people using these 
online communications devices each share common practices online, 
with a shared set of principles to govern interaction there.  Thus, 
each can be defined as its own community. 
Finally, as the Court intimated in Sullivan, the nation is now far 
more cohesive than it was at the founding.242  Because of nationwide 
communications mechanisms and easy interstate travel, Americans 
share many more cultural reference points than they did two centu-
ries ago.  Further, the Reconstruction Amendments explicitly forged 
a shared legal baseline for purposes of several government endeavors, 
including voting, protection of the laws, and the provision of due 
process associated with deprivations of life, liberty or property.  Thus, 
engaging in voting, seeking protection of the law, and the valuing of 
life, liberty, and property are nationally common practices.  Further, 
the interconnectedness of daily life—via computer communication, 
national television news, national newspapers, interstate travel, and 
the like, means that the entire nation can be said to share a common 
geographic circumstance in a way that was not true at the Founding.  
In short, the entire nation comprises a single Gesellschaft community. 
B. Applying an Anti-Externalization Rule to Twenty-First Century 
Communities 
Constitutional dignitary tort law can move away from the Court’s 
failed categorization scheme while obeying Sullivan’s admonition 
against externalizing subsidiary community norms onto other com-
munities. If the concept of community were disambiguated to 
acknowledge the multiplicity of communities in the twenty-first cen-
tury—geographically subsidiary communities, virtually subsidiary 
communities, and a single national community—the Court could 
mediate speech-tort conflicts without relying on complex and obso-
lete categories.243  Instead, the constitutional rule would simply pro-
 
241 See, e.g., Catalina Danis & Alison Lee, The Negotiation of Norms in an Online Community (IBM 
TJ Watson Research Ctr., Working Paper).  
242 See, e.g., RONALD D. BROWN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LIFE 1600–1865, at 112–
23 (1976). 
243 Scholars have suggested in other contexts that sensitivity to differently “sized” communi-
ties could justify varying levels of constitutional intervention into private behavior.  See, 
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hibit judicial enforcement of verdicts that externalize subsidiary 
community norms.  When speech and injury take place entirely with-
in a single subsidiary committee, private law tort treatment is war-
ranted and the subsidiary community is free to develop and apply its 
own norms free from constitutional oversight.  In contrast, when 
speech and injury take place within the national community, or in-
volve a clash between subsidiary communities or between a subsidiary 
community and the national community, juries would employ tradi-
tional private law tort rules with the constitutional backstop that 
courts may not enforce judgments externalizing a subsidiary commu-
nity’s norms outside its own boundaries.244  This rule would achieve 
the Court’s primary goal of protecting nationally relevant speech, but 
not by delegitimizing the subsidiary community as a legally relevant 
unit of social organization, and not by signaling that dignitary inter-
ests are per se lesser than speech interests.  Further, where the subsid-
iary community at issue is a virtual community that employs injurious 
speech norms—such as a revenge porn website or mugshot extortion 
site—the rule would require those minority norms to give way if the 
national consensus were that the practices were primarily injurious 
rather than primarily message-oriented.  The current categorical 
scheme is apt to reach the opposite result because any plaintiff fea-
tured on such a site is likely to be categorized as a public figure re-
quired to clear a higher constitutional hurdle. 
 
e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism, and Federalism, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 
669–70 (2003) (proposing that application of the Establishment Clause should fluctuate 
in proportion to the level of government that is acting; be it federal, state or local).  Tai-
loring Establishment Clause jurisprudence in this way would capitalize on the “underuti-
lized flexibility” of federalism and would respect community choices about religion and 
morality at the most highly subsidiary, compact levels (such as Orthodox Jewish enclaves) 
while preserving the national constitutional right to be free of establishment. See generally 
id. 
244 In practice, it might be challenging to operationalize the adjudication of dignitary tort 
cases pursuant to this principle.  At some point, the court would have to determine the 
nature of the community or communities within which the allegedly defamatory speech 
circulated to identify whether a verdict would have the potential to externalize communi-
ty norms.  Further, as the case progressed, the parties might have to introduce evidence 
on the relevant community norms so that a jury would have some basis for determining 
defamatoriness, outrageousness, or offensiveness and so that the court would have some 
basis for determining the extent of any mismatch.  Those challenges are likely surmount-
able; further, merely changing the relevant constitutional rule in these cases has the pow-
er to signal a revived role for tort concepts of duty and to sensitize speakers to the rela-
tional significance of their words. 
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1. Anti-Externalization in the Intracommunity Context 
This “anti-externalization” rule would yield a more dignity-
protective outcome than the Court has allowed in intracommunity 
cases to date.  For instance, it would have led to a different result 
where a businessman in Greenbelt, Maryland sued the local paper for 
calling him a “blackmailer” in his dealings with the Greenbelt gov-
ernment.245  The jury decided the word could be understood as an 
imputation of criminality, was therefore defamatory, and awarded 
damages.246 The Court rejected the Greenbelt jury’s decision about how 
the average local reader would understand the word, and imposed a 
national rule that blackmail cannot be understood to impute criminal-
ity.247  Ironically, this outcome could actually be said to impose moral 
values top-down as one would expect from a Gemeinschaft community.  
A Gesellschaft community that is consistent with the Court’s liberal 
democratic theory interpretation of the First Amendment would be 
expected to allow different interpretations of the word to flourish in 
subcommunities, without imposing a national interpretation when 
national speech is not involved.248  The proposed rule, allowing pri-
vate law treatment of intracommunity speech and injury, would yield 
that result. 
The anti-externalization rule would apply equally well in the 
online context.  It does not automatically denominate online speech 
as “public” just because it is theoretically accessible to a wide number 
of people.  Instead, if speech takes place within an online community 
with agreed upon norms, it would be subject to private law treatment 
and the community would be allowed to apply its own norms.  For in-
stance, Instagram might be identified as a subsidiary virtual commu-
 
245 See Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 7–8 (1970). 
246 Id. at 8. 
247 Id. at 14–15. 
248 See, e.g., Post, supra note 137, at 504 (explaining the view that the First Amendment is de-
signed to create an antihegemonic domain, one result of which is to “prevent law from 
resolving cultural conflict within public discourse by enforcing cultural norms”).  It is not 
implausible to contend that the Supreme Court’s provision of the meaning of a word for 
all time, and for the whole nation, is more of a legal resolution of a cultural conflict than 
for a local jury to devise the meaning of the word for purposes of a single, non-binding 
tort case.  In contrast, some might argue that leaving local communities entirely to their 
own devices in determining the significance of speech increases the possibility that ho-
mogeneous communities will punish dissenters for unpopular speech.  While possible, 
the “falsehood” requirement of the tort is a backstop preventing vindictive juries from si-
lencing adversaries at will.  Further, the threat of a speech “chill” posed by public law 
prohibitions is qualitatively different than the threat posed by private law causes of action 
that require an injured plaintiff willing to sue and that results at most in an ex post mon-
ey damage award (often covered by insurance). 
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nity because its users generally adhere to a common nucleus of 
shared practices.  In one recent example, a rash of so-called “funeral 
selfies” on Instagram has occasioned some pushback, with many par-
ticipants complaining that pictures trivializing funeral rites are out of 
keeping with the app’s culture.249  Consequently, a message appended 
to an Instagram post might be considered “outrageous” and the basis 
for an IIED claim by the injured Instagram user.  Instagram’s norms 
could be applied to treat the contested speech as a tort without im-
posing the site’s norms on the national community or on other In-
ternet communities.250 In these intra-virtual community cases, the 
Constitution need not be invoked to prevent morally or geographical-
ly distinct communities from imposing their values on conflicting 
communities within the state or nation.  Further, cohesive communi-
ties would have latitude to make normative judgments ex post about 
whether external injuries imposed via speech need to be 
reinternalized by the defendant community member through a tort 
verdict. 
2. Anti-Externalization in the Intercommunity Context 
Dignitary torts that take place across more than one community 
are more complex.  In those cases, there is a legitimate fear that 
where the plaintiff belongs to an insular community, a tort suit is an 
attempt to impose that community’s norms outside its own bounda-
ries, thus inhibiting speakers who are contributing to a national dia-
log.  Conversely, when the plaintiff belongs to the “national” com-
munity and sues for injuries inflicted by a defendant abiding by his 
insular community norms, there is a legitimate fear that the ostensi-
bly “public” nature of the speech may prevent a tort verdict that 
would protect a nationally agreed upon dignitary value. 
In these cases, the proposed constitutional rule would prohibit 
the imposition of insular norms onto the nation as a whole.  Adopt-
ing this rule instead of the current constitutional matrix would let ju-
ries respond flexibly to behavior that defies public-private and know-
ing-negligent categorizations.  Absent the categorical requirements of 
Sullivan, juries would exercise their common-sense familiarity with 
 
249 Karen James, Selfies at Funerals?  That’s a No, DELAWARE ONLINE (May 12, 2014, 3:53 PM), 
http://www.delawareonline.com/story/life/2014/05/12/selfies-funerals/9007293 (not-
ing among other incidents the removal of a Wisconsin National Guard specialist for the 
Honor Guard after posting Instagram shots of the Guard mugging in front of a flag-
draped casket). 
250 Again, the jury would have to hear evidence regarding Instagram’s norms in order to suc-
cessfully apply those norms to the contested speech. 
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current speech norms.  They could determine that a particular 
statement was designed primarily to circulate a significant message 
(with injury infliction a mere byproduct) that must be protected.  Or 
they could determine that it was designed primarily to inflict injury 
(with message circulation a mere pretext) and may be punished.  Li-
ability would be assigned accordingly.  The reviewing court, however, 
would retain constitutional discretion to reverse or remand if it de-
termines that the verdict amounts to an externalization of the subsid-
iary community values onto the national community. 
This rule would recalibrate the current balance between speech 
and dignity.  For instance, a plaintiff would be prohibited from lever-
aging protective local speech norms when challenging the way he was 
portrayed in national press coverage of an issue that crossed multiple 
jurisdictions.  Thus, the rule would have foreclosed the verdict in Sul-
livan.  By the same token, members of insular online communities 
would not be able to leverage those communities’ practices to defend 
against tort liability for injuries imposed outside the community.  The 
most relevant current example of such an insular-national mismatch 
is revenge porn, the posting of prurient photos of women without 
their knowledge or approval.251  This kind of speech is considered 
normatively acceptable among members of the insular virtual com-
munities that use these sites, but is widely acknowledged to inflict 
dignitary injuries on non-members.252  In the case of this community 
mismatch, the insular community would not be allowed to impose its 
norms onto the nation at large.  If a jury taking account of national 
sentiment determined that a particular instance of revenge porn was 
“outrageous,” for instance, the proposed constitutional rule would 
permit the imposition of IIED liability even though the insular com-
munity that hosted the speech did not consider it outrageous. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s current constitutional common law of dignitary tort 
establishes a categorical preference for the community values of the 
nation over the community values of more subsidiary groups, even 
where the two are not in conflict.  As more speech goes online and 
 
251 Citron & Franks, supra note 1, at 346. 
252 Id. at 351 n.35 (citing Cyber Civil Rights Statistics on Revenge Porn, at 2 (Oct. 11, 2013), 
for the proposition that “more than 80% of revenge porn victims experience severe emo-
tional distress and anxiety”); id. at 390 n.290 (noting that two major metropolitan daily 
newspapers, the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune, have taken editorial positions 
condemning revenge porn). 
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becomes publicly accessible, the use of “public” and “private” catego-
ries to distinguish between constitutional treatment and private law 
treatment for these torts is no longer effective.  Moreover, the Court 
has touted the scheme as one that extracts from tort litigation im-
permissible value judgments about the content of speech.253  This 
representation is disingenuous—prioritizing a community inevitably 
means prioritizing a set of values. 
For instance, the Court has suggested that in the obscenity con-
text, requiring local communities to tolerate material offensive to 
them is just as problematic as limiting national access to material 
based on a single community’s disapproval.254  The Court has explicit-
ly allowed local communities to provide the standard for prurience in 
challenges to regulation of obscene material.255  Those communities 
are generally thought to be less tolerant of obscenity.  By selecting lo-
cal communities as the structurally privileged unit of analysis, the 
Court was essentially picking sides in this cultural conflict.  When the 
Court established a set of default rules that privilege the national 
community in the dignitary tort context, it was using the same tactic 
in reverse.  Identifying the national community norms as the consti-
tutional norms meant the Court was essentially picking sides in a cul-
tural conflict.  This use of ostensibly neutral principles to dictate 
speech preferences top-down is typified by the Court’s decision in 
Bresler to replace a local jury interpretation of the ambiguous word 
“blackmail” with its own interpretation.256 
This sharp dealing is a direct (if subtle) outgrowth of the Court’s 
state action analysis in Sullivan.  The First Amendment is designed to 
prohibit government preference for particular values, but the Court’s 
scheme incorporates a vertical preference for “national” values over 
those of subsidiary communities.  Ironically, the Equal Protection 
 
253 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (holding that without 
constitutional limits the IIED tort threatened to sanction speech based on jury disagree-
ment with its content); see also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 84 (1971) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting and noting that defamation liability without constitutional limits 
could lead to punishment of “unorthodox and unpopular” speech). 
254 See, e.g., Bret Boyce, Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 299, 320–21 
(2008) (explaining that the three-part obscenity test announced in Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15, 30 (1973) allows local communities to determine whether, by reference to their 
local norms, material is offensive). 
255 See id. at 321 (“But it is perfectly permissible to apply a local standard, even in a federal 
obscenity prosecution.  Indeed, the Court held, it is perfectly proper for a court to in-
struct a jury to apply community standards without ever specifying which community.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
256 See Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 22 (1970) (White, J., dissenting). 
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Clause arguably does adopt a set of preferred social values (those of 
the Reconstruction Era Northern States),257 so that a broad definition 
of state action to impose those values in cases like Shelley or Evans 
would have had some constitutional basis.  In contrast, neither the 
First Amendment nor the Due Process Clause through which it was 
incorporated against the states endorse any set of values; they are de-
signed to establish a value-free zone.258  So manipulating state action 
to allow a vertical imposition of “national” values (implicitly, the cul-
turally elite values of the Court itself)259 onto dignitary tort may be 
more constitutionally suspect than manipulating state action to rem-
edy perceived violations of other constitutional provisions would have 
been.260 
Further, the horizontal overreach into the legislative function to 
establish a categorical speech regime has functionally disabled tort, 
both as a private remedy and as a social signaling device.  Moreover, 
it has not produced a marked increase in the quality or quantity of 
democratically relevant speech.  Fifty years after Sullivan, it is time for 
the Court to consider backing away from its quasi-statutory tort 
scheme in favor of a more flexible rule that merely prohibits the im-
position of insular values onto the nation.  This flexible rule has the 
potential to reinvigorate dignitary tort as online speech continues to 
metastasize in unexpected ways.  The second coming of these torts 
would encourage experiential, bottom-up development of behavioral 
norms in an incremental, ex post fashion.261  Further, treating online 
behavior that inflicts individual injury as primarily a matter for tort 
law would foreclose the need for lawmakers to criminalize wide 
 
257 See Post, supra note 137, at 499 (“The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . realized 
that the right to Equal Protection of the Laws would require courts to impose the cultural 
values of the North upon the South.”). 
258 See id.  
259 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 
145, 146 (1998). 
260 See Post, supra note 137, at 499.  Moreover, it is virtually impossible to administer a per se 
preference for a national or local community in the speech context, when online com-
munication defies geographic boundaries.  The circulation of would-be obscene materials 
on the internet has led some lower courts to find application of local standards impracti-
cable, and a brewing circuit split on the question suggests that the Court may have to re-
visit the viability of the geographically local community test.  See, e.g., Noah Hertz-Bunze, 
The Internet, Obscenity and Community Standards:  The Emerging Kilbride and Little Circuit Split, 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. (Feb. 14, 2011), http://iplj.net/blog/
archives/1660. 
261 See, e.g., Rustad, supra note 131, at 478–79 (discussing history of tort as “continually evolv-
ing to address new social problems”). 
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swaths of electronic speech ex ante from the top-down and may actu-
ally be the most speech-protective way to address these phenomena.262 
 
262 Criminal treatment carries some costs that tort may not.  First, criminal statutes would 
have to withstand a different, and potentially more difficult, level of constitutional scruti-
ny. See Citron & Franks, supra note 1, at 374–75.  Further, the state machinery required to 
pass these statutes and to prosecute violations is more expensive than “private attorney 
general” tort treatment.  To be sure, litigating revenge porn tort suits does cost individual 
plaintiffs (although most attorneys would likely take such cases on a contingency basis) 
and defendants may be judgment-proof or nearly so.  Id. at 358.  However, merely provid-
ing a robust cause of action for such cases has expressive value, and even a small number 
of high-profile plaintiff verdicts in such cases has the potential to recalibrate notions of 
what duty is owed within the intimate relationships that typically lead to the taking and 
sharing of materials likely to be found on such sites.  See Bloom, supra note 2, at 229. 
